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ARTICLES

Making Directed Trusts Work:
The Uniform Directed Trust Act*
John D. Morley**
Robert H. Sitkoff***

ABSTRACT
Directed trusts have become a familiar feature of trust practice in
spite of considerable legal uncertainty about them. Fortunately, the Uniform Law Commission has just finished work on the Uniform Directed
Trust Act (UDTA), a new uniform law that offers clear solutions to the
many legal uncertainties surrounding directed trusts. This article offers an
overview of the UDTA, with particular emphasis on four areas of practical innovation. The first is a careful allocation of fiduciary duties. The
UDTA’s basic approach is to take the law of trusteeship and attach it to
whichever person holds the powers of trusteeship, even if that person is
not formally a trustee. Thus, under the UDTA the fiduciary responsibility
for a power of direction attaches primarily to the trust director (or trust
protector or trust adviser) who holds the power, with only a diminished
duty to avoid “willful misconduct” applying to a directed trustee (or administrative trustee). The second innovation is a comprehensive treatment
of non-fiduciary issues, such as appointment, vacancy, and limitations.
Here again, the UDTA largely absorbs the law of trusteeship for a trust
director. The UDTA also deals with new and distinctive subsidiary
problems that do not arise in ordinary trusts, such as the sharing of infor* Portions of this article are adapted with the permission of the Uniform Law
Commission from the comments to the Uniform Directed Trust Act without further
citation or acknowledgment. The authors were the principal drafters of those comments.
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mation between a trustee and a trust director. The third innovation is a
reconciliation of directed trusts with the traditional law of cotrusteeship.
The UDTA permits a settlor to allocate fiduciary duties between cotrustees in a manner similar to the allocation between a trust director and directed trustee in a directed trust. A final innovation is a careful system of
exclusions that preserves existing law and settlor autonomy with respect to
tax planning, revocable trusts, powers of appointment, and other issues.
All told, if appropriately modified to fit local policy preferences, the
UDTA could improve on the directed trust law of every state. The UDTA
can also be used by practitioners in any state to identify the key issues in a
directed trust and to find sensible, well-drafted solutions that can be absorbed into the terms of a directed trust.
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INTRODUCTION
Across the centuries, the law of trusts evolved on the assumption
that the power to administer a trust would belong to a trustee. The investment, distribution, and management of a trust’s property were all
the responsibility of a trustee, rather than of a beneficiary, settlor, or
anyone else who was not formally a trustee. This tradition is being challenged, however, by the growing trend toward drafting the terms of a
trust to grant a power over the trust to a person who is not a trustee. In
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such a trust, commonly known as a directed trust,1 a person known as a
trust director2 (or, alternately, as a trust protector or trust adviser) does
not hold legal title to the trust property and is not a trustee, but nevertheless may hold a power over the trust that might otherwise belong to a
trustee. The powers and duties of a trustee in a directed trust, who may
be known as a directed trustee or an administrative trustee,3 are to varying degrees subject to the supervening power of the non-trustee trust
director.
The fundamental policy question posed by directed trusts is how to
divide the law of trusteeship between a trust director and a trustee.4
When the power to administer a trust belongs exclusively to a trustee,
there seems little question that the fiduciary duties and subsidiary rules
of trusteeship should apply exclusively to the trustee. But when the
terms of a trust divide power between a trustee and a trust director,
applying the law of trusteeship becomes much harder. There is disagreement, for example, whether a trust director should be subject to the fiduciary duties of trusteeship, and whether a directed trustee should be
subject to reduced fiduciary duties—or no fiduciary duties at all.5 The
case law is sparse, and notwithstanding the success of the Uniform Trust
Code, existing statutes are in disarray.
Fortunately, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) has just finished
work on the Uniform Directed Trust Act (UDTA), a new uniform law
that offers clear solutions to the many legal uncertainties surrounding
1 The Uniform Directed Trust Act [UNIF. DIRECTED TRUST ACT (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2017)], hereinafter “UDTA,” defines a “directed trust” in § 2(2).
2 The UDTA defines a “trust director” in § 2(9).
3 The UDTA defines a “directed trustee” in § 2(3).
4 We will examine this point more deeply in a scholarly project tentatively entitled
The Rise of Directed Trusts: Unbundling Title, Power, and Fiduciary Duty.
5 See, e.g., Alexander A. Bove, Jr., A Protector by Any Other Name . . ., 8 EST.
PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 1 (2015); Alexander A. Bove, Jr., Trust Protectors in the
United States. A Step Behind the Rest of the World, 22 TR. & TR. 737 (2016); Matthew
Conaglen & Elizabeth Weaver, Protectors as Fiduciaries: Theory and Practice, 18 TR. &
TR. 17 (2012); William S. Echols, Action in the Chasm: Defining Duties of the Trustee’s
Delegates, 6 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 397 (2014); David A. Diamond & Todd A.
Flubacher, The Trustee’s Role in Directed Trusts, 149 TR. & EST., Dec. 2010, at 24; Lawrence A. Frolik, Trust Protectors: Why They Have Become “The Next Big Thing,” 50
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 267 (2015); Andrew T. Huber, Trust Protectors: The Role
Continues to Evolve, 31 PROB. & PROP. 1 (2017); R. Hugh Magill, Allocating Fiduciary
Responsibility, 154 TR. & EST., May 2015, at 36; Alan Newman, Trust Law in the TwentyFirst Century: Challenges to Fiduciary Accountability, 29 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 261
(2016); Charles A. Redd, Directed Trusts - Who’s Responsible?, 154 TR. & EST., Sept.
2015, at 11; Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Trust Protector: A Question of Fiduciary
Power. Should a Trust Protector Be Held to a Fiduciary Standard?, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 67
(2010); Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761 (2005).
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directed trusts.6 The UDTA was approved by the ULC in 2017 after
several years of drafting in consultation with a committee of nationally
recognized experts in trust law from law practice, banks and trust companies, and academia.7 The UDTA provides clear, practical, and comprehensive solutions to the major legal difficulties in a directed trust. At
the same time, the UDTA offers a host of practical innovations that
improve on the statutes that many states have already enacted to deal
with directed trusts.
Specifically, the UDTA offers four areas of innovation. The first
concerns the fiduciary duties of a trust director and a directed trustee.
The basic approach of the UDTA is to take the law of trusteeship and
attach it to whichever person holds the powers of trusteeship, even if
that person is not a trustee. Thus, under the UDTA the fiduciary responsibility for a power of direction attaches primarily to the trust director who holds the power, rather than to the directed trustee who
facilitates the director’s exercise of the power. A directed trustee is thus
relieved from the full panoply of fiduciary duties of a unitary trusteeship, and has only a diminished duty to avoid “willful misconduct” in
deciding whether to comply with a director’s directions.8
This simple and intuitive approach to dividing duties has already
proven successful and workable in Delaware.9 The UDTA improves on
the Delaware model, however, by providing greater clarity in specifying
the duties of a trust director. In prescribing the duties of a trust director,
the UDTA provides that a director bears the same fiduciary duties as a
trustee “in a like position and under similar circumstances.”10 The comparison to a trustee in a like position and under similar circumstances
adds specificity while also preserving flexibility and sensitivity to context
6 For enactment and other information, see ULC, ACTS, DIRECTED TRUST ACT,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=directed%20Trust%20Act (last visited, Oct.
9, 2018).
7 For the committee roster and iterative development, see UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
Committees, Directed Trust Act, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=direct
ed%20Trust%20Act (last visited, Oct. 9, 2018).
8 UDTA §§ 8–9. The UDTA also requires a trustee to “take reasonable action” to
comply with a director’s exercise or nonexercise of its powers. UDTA § 9(a). However,
as the comments to § 9 make clear, the duty to take reasonable action is a duty to act
reasonably in carrying out the acts necessary to comply with a director’s action, not a
duty to ensure that the substance of the direction is reasonable. See infra Part II.B.4.
9 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313 (2018); see also Diamond & Flubacher, supra
note 5; Mary Clarke & Diana S.C. Zeydel, Directed Trusts: The Statutory Approaches to
Authority and Liability, 35 EST. PLAN. 9 (2008); Magill, supra note 5; Richard W. Nenno,
Can Directed Trustees Limit Their Liability?, 21 PROB. & PROP. 45 (2007); Redd, supra
note 5.
10 UDTA § 8(a). The phrasing derives from MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2017).
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in addressing the immense variation among the powers that may be
given to a trust director.11
A second innovation is to address non-fiduciary matters in the subsidiary law of trust administration. Although many directed trust statutes address fiduciary duties, no existing statute comprehensively
addresses subsidiary matters such as acceptance, compensation, vacancy,
and limitations periods. Unlike existing statutes, the UDTA anticipates
these subsidiary issues and adopts the same basic solution that it applies
to fiduciary duties—it takes the law of trusteeship and applies it to trust
directors.12 Thus, for example, the law of succession is the same for a
trust director as it is for a trustee in a like position and under similar
circumstances.13 In addition to absorbing the law of trusteeship for trust
directors in this way, the UDTA also deals with new and distinctive subsidiary problems that do not arise in ordinary trusts, such as the sharing
of information between a trustee and a trust director.14
A third innovation is to reconcile the traditional law of cotrusteeship with the broader settlor autonomy recognized in a directed trust.15
The UDTA expands the settlor’s autonomy in designing a cotrusteeship
by authorizing the terms of a trust to allocate fiduciary responsibility
among cotrustees in a way that mirrors the allocation among a trust director and a directed trustee.16 Thus, under the UDTA, a cotrustee who
is subject to direction by another cotrustee can be relieved of fiduciary
responsibility in the same way that the UDTA relieves a directed trustee
who is directed by a trust director. The UDTA does not apply this treatment by default, but rather it gives a settlor the freedom to do so by
choice.
A fourth and final innovation is a carefully thought-out system of
exclusions that preserves existing law and settlor autonomy with respect
to a host of issues that are collateral to the emergence of directed
trusts.17 Among other things, the UDTA preserves tax planning in existing trusts by excluding from the act any power that must be held in a
nonfiduciary capacity to achieve a settlor’s federal tax objectives.18 The
UDTA also preserves existing plans by preventing the settlor of a revocable trust or the donee of a power of appointment from being unintentionally characterized as a trust director by virtue of having a power
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

See infra Part II.A.
UDTA §§ 13, 14, 16; infra Part III.
See UDTA § 16(4)–(6).
UDTA § 10; see infra Part II.C.
UDTA § 12; see infra Part IV.
UDTA § 12.
Id. § 5; see infra Part I.D.
See UDTA § 5(b)(5).
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over the trust.19 This exclusion is important, because it corrects an unacknowledged drafting error in many existing directed trust statutes, including the Delaware statute, which, if read literally, would make the
settlor of a revocable trust and the donee of a power of appointment
into trustee-like fiduciaries by virtue of their powers over the trust.20
The UDTA anticipates and corrects this error.
These and other practical improvements in the UDTA are so significant that the UDTA is appropriate for adoption by every state. Although some states may wish to change the standard for the fiduciary
responsibility of a directed trustee or trust director,21 no other provisions of the UDTA should provoke serious controversy. A state that
wishes to modify the fiduciary duty of a directed trustee or trust director
could easily do so while leaving the rest of the UDTA intact and gaining
its benefits. The UDTA is so much simpler, more comprehensive, and
more practically adept than the existing statutes that, with a few small
adjustments, every state could use the UDTA to improve its law while
still remaining consistent with its distinctive policy preferences.
The UDTA can also serve as a resource for drafters of directed
trusts even in states that have not adopted in at least two ways. First, the
extensive provisions of the UDTA, which address numerous issues not
touched on by the existing state statutes, can serve as a guide or a checklist for issues a drafter should address expressly in the terms of a directed trust. Second, the solutions to those issues provided by the
UDTA offer a model—and indeed, even model language—for how to
address them in the terms of a directed trust.
Let us now turn to the details. Part I examines the scope of the
UDTA and its careful system of exclusions that preserve existing law
and settlor autonomy with respect to collateral matters—that is, the
fourth of the four innovations noted above. We will then consider the
other three innovations in the order given above. Thus, Part II examines
the UDTA’s answer to the core question of allocating fiduciary responsibility among a trust director and a directed trustee and the deeply intertwined questions of information sharing and cross-monitoring among
trust directors and directed trustees. Part III examines the UDTA’s coverage of the various non-fiduciary matters in the subsidiary law of trust
administration that might be overlooked in drafting a directed trust and
that for the most part are not addressed by the existing statutes. Part IV
examines the UDTA’s reconciliation of the law of cotrusteeship with the
19

See id. § 5(b)(1), (3).
Id. § 5(b)(3); infra Part I.D.1, I.D.3.
21 We discuss below the different standards of fiduciary duty prevailing among existing state statutes. See infra Part II.A (trust directors); Part II.B.1 (directed trustees).
20
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broad settlor autonomy permitted with respect to a directed trust. A
short conclusion follows.
I. SCOPE

AND

EXCLUSIONS

A. A Capacious Scope
We begin our tour through the UDTA by considering the statute’s
scope. In accordance with the principle of freedom of disposition,22 the
UDTA promotes settlor autonomy by validating a grant of a power of
direction.23 Accordingly, the scope of the statute depends largely on
which powers qualify as a “power of direction.” If the terms of a trust
are found to include a power of direction, then the statute applies.24
1. Defining a “Power of Direction”
Section 2(5) of the UDTA defines a “power of direction” as “a
power over a trust granted to a person by the terms of the trust to the
extent the power is exercisable while the person is not serving as a trustee.”25 The heart of this definition is the broadly worded phrase “power
over a trust.” Though it consists of a mere four words, this phrase was
the subject of intense care and discussion in the drafting process, and it
counts as one of the UDTA’s many practical innovations.
The phrase is innovative because of its great breadth. It is capacious
enough to cover all of the conventional powers of trusteeship, such as a
power to invest or distribute the trust property, as well as other powers
that may not conventionally belong to a trustee, such as a power to
amend or terminate the trust. The phrase is also broad enough to cover
every form that such a power might take. The term “power of direction”
includes both a power to direct a trustee to act (such as when a director
tells a trustee to invest in particular assets) and a power in a director to
act on his or her own (such when the terms of a trust permit a director
to sign an investment subscription agreement without the trustee’s par22 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition,
58 ST. LOUIS L.J. 643 (2014).
23 See UDTA, Prefatory Note (“By validating terms of a trust that grant a trust
director a power of direction, the Uniform Directed Trust Act promotes settlor autonomy
in accordance with the principle of freedom of disposition.”). The UDTA defines a
“power of direction” in § 2(9).
24 The definition of “terms of a trust” in UDTA § 2(8) accounts for the possibility of
changes to those terms owing to court order or nonjudicial settlement agreement. See
Todd A. Flubacher & Kenneth F. Hunt, The Non-Judicial Settlement Agreement Wrapper,
152 TR. & EST., Dec. 2013, at 1. In 2018, the ULC amended the definition of “terms of a
trust” in the Uniform Trust Code accordingly. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(18) (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N, amended 2018).
25 UDTA § 2(5).

Winter 2019]

MAKING DIRECTED TRUSTS WORK

11

ticipation). The term also covers powers to veto or consent to a trustee’s
actions in advance or a power to release a trustee from liability for prior
conduct. The only types or kinds of powers over a trust that do not qualify as powers of direction are those covered by the categorical exclusions
from the statute prescribed by § 5, to which we turn below.26
To avoid any doubt about the capaciousness of the definition of a
power of direction, the drafting committee took two further steps to
clarify. First, within the blackletter statutory language of the definition
of “power of direction,” the drafting committee included the further
statement that “[t]he term includes a power over the investment, management, or distribution of trust property or other matters of trust administration.” The accompanying comment explains that
a power of direction may include a power over “matters of
trust administration” as well as a power over “investment,
management, or distribution of trust property.” These examples are meant to illustrate the potential scope of a power of
direction rather than to limit it. In using the term “administration,” the drafting committee intended a meaning at least as
broad as that found in the context of determining a trust’s
“principal place of administration,” such as under Section 3(b).
The drafting committee also intended the terms “investment,
management, or distribution” to have a meaning at least as
broad as that found in Uniform Trust Code § 815(a)(2)(b)
(2000), which specifies a trustee’s default powers.27
As a second measure for the avoidance of doubt about the UDTA’s
scope, the drafting committee elsewhere in the comments provided a
non-exclusive but detailed list of the types or kinds of specific powers
that the committee contemplated would fall within the definition of a
power of direction. Those further comments explain that term includes a
power to:
• acquire, dispose of, exchange, or retain an investment;
• make or take loans;
• vote proxies for securities held in trust;
• adopt a particular valuation of trust property or determine the frequency or methodology of valuation;
• adjust between principal and income or convert to a unitrust;
• manage a business held in the trust;
• select a custodian for trust assets;
• modify, reform, terminate, or decant a trust;
26
27

See infra Part I.D.
UDTA § 2 cmt.
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• direct a trustee’s or another director’s delegation of the trustee’s or
other director’s powers;
• change the principal place of administration, situs, or governing law
of the trust;
• ascertain the happening of an event that affects the administration of
the trust;
• determine the capacity of a trustee, settlor, director, or beneficiary of
the trust;
• determine the compensation to be paid to a trustee or trust director;
• prosecute, defend, or join an action, claim, or judicial proceeding relating to the trust;
• grant permission before a trustee or another director may exercise a
power of the trustee or other director; or
• release a trustee or another trust director from liability for an action
proposed or previously taken by the trustee or other director.28
The drafting committee based this list on a comprehensive review of every existing state directed trust statute and on a sampling
of directed trust provisions provided by multiple trust lawyers and
bankers who served as observers and advisers to the drafting committee.29 The list therefore covers every power that is specifically
enumerated as a power of direction in an existing directed trust statute as well as every example that the drafting committee and its numerous observers and advisers could conjure up. The capacious
wording in the blackletter definition of a power of direction plus the
broad inclusiveness of the examples in the comments make the
UDTA the most comprehensive directed trust statute yet written.
2. Excluding a Serving Trustee
Having broadly equated a “power of direction” with any “power
over a trust,” the drafting committee took care to ensure that the definition would not swallow the law of trusteeship by transforming the powers over a trust that belong to a trustee into powers of direction. The
definition of a “power of direction” in § 2(5) provides that a “power
over a trust” is a “power of direction” only “to the extent the power is
exercisable while the person” who holds the power “is not serving as a
trustee.”30 The comment explains that “[t]he purpose of this limitation is
to exclude a person serving as trustee from the definition of a trust di28 Id. § 6 cmt. The comment indicates that this list was meant to be illustrative
rather than limiting.
29 See UNIF. LAW COMM’N, DIRECTED TRUST ACT, MARCH 2015 COMMITTEE
MEETING – APPENDIX A, http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/divided%20trustee
ship/Appendix%20A%20-%20UDTA%20Spring%202015.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2018).
30 UDTA § 2(5).
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rector, even though as trustee the person will inevitably have a ‘power
over a trust.’”31 The purpose of the UDTA is “to address the complications created by giving a person other than a trustee—that is, a trust
director—a power over a trust. A power over a trust held by a trustee is
governed by existing trust fiduciary law.”32
3. Defining a “Directed Trust,” “Directed Trustee,” and “Trust
Director”
The UDTA defines its other key terms in relation to the definition
of a power of direction. A “directed trust” is “a trust for which the terms
of the trust grant a power of direction.”33 A “trust director” is “a person
that is granted a power of direction by the terms of a trust to the extent
the power is exercisable while the person is not serving as a trustee.”34
And a “directed trustee” is “a trustee that is subject to a trust director’s
power of direction.”35
Crucially, these definitions are functional, rather than formal, and
they apply without regard to the terminology used by the terms of particular a trust. The definition of a “trust director,” for example, expressly provides that a person who satisfies the functional definition of a
trust director “is a trust director whether or not the terms of the trust
refer to the person as a trust director and whether or not the person is a
beneficiary or settlor of the trust.”36 So long as the functional criteria
prescribed by the UDTA’s definitions are satisfied, a power will be
treated as a power of direction even if it is labeled as a “power of protection,” “power of investment,” or “power of administration.” Thus, a
person who holds a power of direction is a trust director even if the
terms of the trust label the person as a “trust adviser” or “trust protector.” And a trustee is treated as a directed trustee even if the terms of
the trust label the trustee as an “administrative trustee.” The UDTA
applies to a “power of direction,” a “trust director,” and a “directed
trustee” in a “directed trust” in accordance with function not form, and
even if the terms of a trust disclaim this vocabulary.37
31

Id. § 2 cmt.
Id.
33 Id. § 2(2).
34 Id. § 2(9).
35 Id. § 2(3).
36 Id. § 2(9).
37 The clarity in the UDTA’s definitions represents a significant improvement on
the confusing and clumsy definitions in many existing state statutes. In South Dakota, for
example, the definition of a “trust protector” is circular: a trust protector is “any person
whose appointment as a protector is provided for in the instrument.” S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 55-1B-1(2) (2017). In other words, a trust protector is a trust protector. Elsewhere, the South Dakota statute provides examples of powers that might be granted to a
32
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B. An Enabling Statute
The UDTA expressly confirms the validity of a trust with a power
of direction, and therefore the validity of a directed trust with a trust
director and a directed trustee. Section 6(a) provides that “the terms of
a trust may grant a power of direction to a trust director.”38 Thus, although a trust with a power of direction would almost certainly be valid
under the common law,39 the UDTA resolves any doubt with statutory
certainty.
1. Enabling versus Off-the-Rack
Validating a power of direction, and therefore a directed trust with
a trust director and a directed trustee, raises the further question of
what exactly such a power entails. As we have just seen, the term
“power of direction” is defined capaciously to include any power over a
trust.40 But this definition does not answer the question of which powers
over a particular trust are granted to a particular trust director. The definition identifies the concept of a power of direction generally but does
not supply the content of a particular power of direction specifically.
The approaches to this problem in the existing statutes can be divided roughly into two categories: “enabling” and “off-the-rack.” The
enabling statutes, typified by the Delaware statute,41 validate terms of a
trust that grant a power of direction, but they do not prescribe any specific powers by default. A settlor has the freedom to grant a power of
direction, but must specify which powers, if any, she will grant to a particular director.
For example, the Delaware statute provides that a person other
than a trustee may be “given authority by the terms of a governing inprotector. Id. § 55-1b-6. But the statute does not say whether granting one of these powers necessarily makes a person into a protector or specify what else might make a person
into a protector either.
38 UDTA § 6(a).
39 See, e.g., In re Eleanor Pierce (Marshall) Stevens Living Trust, 159 So. 3d 1101,
1106, 1110-11 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (validating terms of a trust creating a trust director
even in the absence of specific statutory authorization); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 75 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (recognizing a third party power to control a trustee); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (same).
40 See UDTA § 2(5); supra Part I.A.
41 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313 (2018); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1410818(A) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-16-801 (2016) (“Trust Advisor”); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 700.7809 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-8-1201(a) (amended 2016); MO. REV.
STAT. § 456.8-808-(2) (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-38-808 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 564-B:7-711(a) (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8A-1 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5808.08(d) (LexisNexis 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-1201 (2018); VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.2-770(E)(1) (2014).
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strument to direct, consent to or disapprove a fiduciary’s actual or proposed investment decisions, distribution decisions or other decision of
the fiduciary.”42 Beyond this broad grant of authorization, however, the
Delaware statute does not provide further guidance on which powers
are included in a particular power of direction in a particular trust.43
Accordingly, under an enabling statute like Delaware’s, the scope of a
trust director’s power of direction is determined by the terms of the
trust. In other words, the content of a power of direction must be supplied by the terms of the trust. The statute provides no standard powers
by default.
By contrast, an off-the-rack statute provides for one or more standard categories of trust director, with various sets of powers given to
each category by default.44 The South Dakota statute, for example, provides for the appointment of an “investment trust advisor” and a “distribution trust advisor,” each with a different set of default powers.45 An
investment trust advisor has powers by default to direct the trustee with
respect to the retention, purchase, or sale of trust property and to vote
proxies for securities held in trust.46 Likewise, a distribution trust adviser has the power to “direct the trustee with regard to all discretionary
distributions.”47
In addition to these standard categories, the South Dakota statute
also has a general category of director called a “trust protector.” The
statute defines a protector in circular fashion as “any person whose ap42

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(a).
The Delaware statute distinguishes between a trust “adviser” and trust “protector,” but merely to say that the term “adviser” includes a “protector.” Id. § 3313(f). The
statute specifies a set of powers that a protector may possess, but the statute does not
provide any of those powers to a protector by default and does not limit a protector to
possessing only those powers. Id. The statute similarly identifies an “investment adviser”
as a person with various powers related to investment, but does not limit such a person’s
powers or supply the person with any powers by default. Id. § 3313(d). The closest the
statute comes to providing default terms for a directed trust is a presumptive definition of
the term “investment decision” that applies unless the terms of the trust provides otherwise. Id.
44 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-1B-1, 55-1B-4 (2018) (protectors, advisors,
investment advisors, distributions advisors); see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.36.370,
13.36.375 (amended 2013) (protectors and advisers); IDAHO CODE § 15-7-501(1) (2018)
(investment advisors, distribution advisors, protectors); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.3(a)(d) (2018) (investment advisors, distribution advisors, protectors); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 163.55533, 163.5537, 163.5543, 163.5545, 163.5547 (2009) (distribution advisers, investment advisers, trust adviser, protectors, custodial account owner); WIS. STAT.
§§ 701.0808, 0818 (2014) (directors and protectors); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-10-710, 712,
718 (2018) (protectors and advisors).
45 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-1B-9, 55-1B-10, 55-1B-11.
46 See id. § 55-1B-10(1)-(2).
47 Id. § 55-1B-11.
43
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pointment as protector is provided for in the instrument,”48 and it provides that “the powers and discretions of a trust protector are as
provided in the governing instrument.”49 The statute includes a menu of
powers that the terms of a trust may grant to a protector, but the statute
does not provide any of those powers by default, nor does it limit a trust
protector to those powers.50 The principal substantive difference between a trust protector and the other two categories of directors appears
to be that a trust protector is not a fiduciary by default,51 whereas an
investment trust advisor and distribution trust adviser are required to be
fiduciaries.52
Other states have other systems of categorization for off-the-rack
powers. Alaska has separate categories for a “trustee adviser,” who may
be given the power to direct a trustee’s actions, and a “trust protector,”
who has the power to (among other things) remove a trustee or modify
a trust instrument.53 A trust adviser may be required to be a fiduciary,54
but a trust protector by default is not.55 Nevada has four categories: a
trust protector, a distribution trust adviser, an investment trust adviser,
and a directing trust adviser.56
In sum, under an off-the-rack statute, a trust director tends to fall
into one or more statutory categories with a predetermined set of default powers and fiduciary duties. A settlor can tailor the powers of a
director in the terms of the trust by adding or subtracting powers and
adjusting the fiduciary duties as the settlor likes. Under an enabling statute, by contrast, the scope of a trust director’s powers and duties is set
by the terms of the trust.
48 Id. § 55-1B-1(2). This circular definition leaves open myriad questions, such as
what exactly a protector is and whether the category of protector includes a trustee who
exercises one of the powers that can be given to a protector.
49 Id. § 55-1B-6.
50 Id. § 55-1B-6(1)-(18).
51 Id. § 55-1B-1(2).
52 Id. § 55-1B-1(6)-(7). The South Dakota statute also includes a definition of the
term “family advisor.” Id. § 55-1B-1(10). The definition declares a family advisor to be
“any person whose appointment is provided for in the governing instrument or by court
order who is authorized to consult with or advise a fiduciary with regard to fiduciary or
nonfiduciary matters and actions, and who may also be authorized by the governing instrument or court order to otherwise act in a nonfiduciary capacity.” Id. The exact significance of this definition is unclear, because the term “family advisor” never appears again
in the statute. One possible interpretation is that a person who holds the powers of a
“family advisor”—i.e., a power to “consult with or advise a fiduciary”—is not a fiduciary.
53 ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.36.370 (amended 2013) (protector), 13.36.375 (advisor).
54 NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.5553 (2009) (protector).
55 ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370(d).
56 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 163.5536 (“directing trust adviser”); 163.5537 (“distribution
trust adviser”); 163.5543 (investment trust adviser”); 163.5547 (“trust protector”).
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2. The UDTA is an Enabling Statute
After carefully considering both models, the UDTA drafting committee opted for an enabling structure. Section 6(a) provides that the
terms of a trust may grant a power of direction to a trust director. However, with just one exception to which we will turn below,57 the UDTA
does not prescribe any powers for a trust director by default and does
not segregate trust directors into distinct categories. The UDTA treats
any power over a trust that is granted to a person other than a serving
trustee as a power of direction, with the scope of that power prescribed
by the terms of the trust, as under the Delaware statute. As the comment to § 6 explains, the UDTA “does not provide any powers to a trust
director by default. Nor does it specify the scope of a power of direction.
The existence and scope of a power of direction must instead be specified by the terms of a trust.”58
The drafting committee favored an enabling model for several reasons. To begin with, an enabling model is simpler. Providing for only a
single class of trust director with only a single set of governing rules
avoids the complexity attendant to the off-the-rack models. Because the
categories in the off-the-rack statutes tend to operate by classifying directors rather than by classifying powers, the contents of the categories
are people, rather than powers. For example, South Dakota has a category for “trust investment advisers” rather than a category for “trust
investment powers.” An awkward consequence of fixating on people
rather than powers in this way is that a single person can occupy several
categories simultaneously—she can be a “trust investment adviser,” a
“distribution trust advisor,” and a “trust protector” all at once, with correspondingly inconsistent and confusing results. The simpler, enabling
approach of the UDTA reduces the risk of litigation about categorization. Under the UDTA, there is only one category of trust director, and
the only powers of a director are those granted by the terms of the trust.
Another problematic consequence of supplying powers by default,
as under the off-the-rack models, is that the powers might come in awkward bundles that frustrate rather than facilitate a settlor’s intent.
Under the South Dakota statute, for example, multiple powers come
bundled together by default, so that an accountant who is granted a
power to direct the trustee “as to the value of nonpublicly traded trust
investments” would by reason of that express power be classified as an
“investment trust adviser.” And as an investment trust adviser, the accountant would have several different powers, including the the power
to direct the trustee “with respect to the retention, purchase, sale,” or
57
58

See infra Part I.C.
UDTA § 6 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
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“exchange” of the trust assets.59 Although some settlors might like this
outcome, it seems likely that many would not. True, a settlor could avoid
the awkward bundling of the South Dakota statute by drafting around
it—but only if the settlor or her lawyer is awake to the issue. Under the
UDTA, by contrast, the problem is avoided in all cases by providing that
a trust director has only those powers granted by the terms of the trust.
Two further points follow. First, the transaction costs savings of an
off-the-rack statute are likely to be illusory. Relative to an enabling statute, an off-the-rack statute could minimize the costs of drafting a directed trust by allowing a drafter to invoke a pre-existing statutory form
of directed trust. In practice, however, a directed trust under an off-therack statute will almost always require tailoring by the terms of the trust
to adapt the statutory form to the particulars of the situation. As the
example of the South Dakota accountant shows, a drafter will need to
specify both the nondefault powers that a trust director holds and the
default powers that the director does not hold. In the meantime, as the
directed trust concept becomes more familiar, formbook boilerplate will
become readily available, simplifying the process of drafting a directed
trust under an enabling statute. In a related vein, an enabling statute will
not require periodic amendments to update its categories and default
powers within those categories to reflect changes in practice.
Second, an enabling statute is less disruptive for existing trusts, because such a statute would not expand a director’s default powers after
the fact in a way that a settlor might not have intended or even contemplated. Consider again the South Dakota statute, which like the UDTA
applies to all trusts regardless of when they were created.60 Suppose an
existing trust that gives a committee of the settlor’s family the power to
vote the trust’s interest in a family business. Under the South Dakota
statute, this power would make the family members into a committee of
“investment trust advisors” with all of the default powers of investment
trust advisors, even if the terms of the trust did not expressly provide
those powers.61 Thus, in addition to having the power to vote the family
shares (as provided by the terms of the trust), the family members
would also have the power to sell those shares.62 The UDTA avoids this
59

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-10(1), (5) (2014).
See Id. § 55-1B-1(1); UDTA § 3(a). We discuss UDTA § 3(a) infra Part I.E.2.
61 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-1B-1(6), 55-1B-10.
62 Id. § 55-1B-10. South Dakota and other off-the-rack statutes do not attempt to
address this problem. To do so would be immensely difficult and complex. Consider, for
example, the recently adopted Uniform Trust Decanting Act (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015).
The decanting act is similar to an off-the-rack directed trust statute in that it grants a new
power to trustees of existing trusts. By default, the act recognizes in certain trustees a
power to decant the trust property even if the terms of the trust do not grant that power
60
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kind of disruption to existing trusts by leaving the content of a director’s
powers to the terms of the trust.
C. Further Powers
Although the UDTA does not generally supply powers by default,
the act does contain one important exception. Section 6(b)(1) provides
that, “[u]nless the terms of a trust provide otherwise, a trust director
may exercise any further power appropriate to the exercise or nonexercise of a power of direction granted to the director” by the terms of a
trust.63 In other words, if the terms of a trust supply an express power,
then by default the UDTA supplies further powers as “appropriate” to
the exercise or nonexericse of that expressly granted power.
Colloquially speaking, § 6(b)(1) operates as a kind of “necessary
and proper” clause, granting additional powers as appropriate to carry
out a settlor’s intent. Following the Uniform Trust Code, the UDTA
uses the term “appropriate” to avoid the narrowing implication sometimes associated with the term “necessary and proper.”64 The comment
explains the meaning of appropriateness thus: “Appropriateness should
be judged in relation to the purpose for which the power was granted
and the function being carried out by the director.”65 The comment
elaborates by way of examples:
[F]urther powers that might be appropriate include a power to:
(1) incur reasonable costs and direct indemnification for those
costs; (2) make a report or accounting to a beneficiary or other
interested party; (3) direct a trustee to issue a certification of
trust under Uniform Trust Code § 1013 (2000); (4) prosecute,
defend, or join an action, claim, or judicial proceeding relating
to a trust; or (5) employ a professional to assist or advise the
expressly. In so doing, the decanting act runs the risk of upsetting a settlor’s planning
objectives just as the South Dakota directed trust statute does for a directed trust.
Unlike the drafters of off-the-rack directed trust statutes, the drafters of the decanting act foresaw this problem and tried to address it. However, doing so required a
long list of limits on the newly recognized default decanting power. Section 19 of the act
imposes a variety of limits on the decanting power. But this provision is long and complicated (it even has its own definitions subsection), and it runs the risk of being incomplete—no one can be certain whether the decanting act has addressed every possible
problem that a default power to decant might create. Off-the-rack directed trust statutes
that supply powers by default pose a similar risk of upsetting a settlor’s plan, and they do
so without any similar saving provisions.
63 UDTA § 6(b)(1).
64 See UDTA § 6(b)(1) cmt. (“The term ‘appropriate’ is drawn from Uniform Trust
Code § 815(a)(2)(B) (2000).”).
65 Id.
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director in the exercise or nonexercise of the director’s
powers.66
Suppose, for example, that the terms of a trust grant a trust director
a power to direct investments. If the trustee refuses to comply with the
director’s exercise of this power, § 6(b)(1) would supply the director
with a further power to bring an action to redress the trustee’s noncompliance, even if the terms of the trust do not expressly supply the
power.67 Manifestly, such an action would be “appropriate” to the director’s exercise of the expressly granted power to direct investments.68
The further powers supplied by § 6(b)(1) count as a major practical
innovation on existing statutes, including the enabling statutes, which
tend not to include such a provision.69 It also offers yet another motivation for the UDTA’s enabling approach, because the further powers in
the UDTA accomplish many of the same objectives as the default powers in off-the-rack statutes, but with greater precision. The UDTA’s further powers are at once less over-inclusive and less under-inclusive than
the default powers in off-the-rack statutes. The UDTA is less over-inclusive, because it includes only those powers “appropriate” to the director’s express powers. Thus, unlike the South Dakota statute, the UDTA
would not tie a power to sell investments to a power to value investments unless tying the two powers together would be appropriate to a
particular settlor’s intent.70
The UDTA’s further powers are also less under-inclusive than the
off-the-rack powers under the statutes, because the UDTA’s further
66

Id.
Id.
68 See id. The comment explains: “It would normally be ‘appropriate,’ for a trust
director to bring an action against a directed trustee if the trustee refused to comply with
a director’s exercise of a power of direction.” UDTA § 6(b)(1) cmt. The UDTA thus
resolves the situation that arose in Schwartz v. Wellin, No. 2:13-CV-3595-DCN, 2014 WL
1572767 (D.S.C. Apr. 17, 2014). The comment describes the case and the UDTA’s
response:
The court held that a trust director, which the terms of the trust referred to as a
“trust protector,” lacked standing to bring a lawsuit under Rule 17(a)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because the director was neither a real party
in interest nor a party that could pursue a claim if not a real party in interest.
67

In some circumstances, subsection (b)(1) may produce a different outcome.
Rule 17(a)(1) allows a party to participate in litigation even if the party is not a
real party in interest if the party is “authorized by statute.” Subsection (b)(1)
supplies the requisite statutory authorization if participating in a lawsuit would
be “appropriate” to a director’s exercise or nonexercise of a power granted by
the terms of the trust under subsection (a).
UDTA § 6(b)(1) cmt.
69 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313 (2018).
70 See supra note 59 and text accompanying.
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powers include every power appropriate to a particular trust, and not
just the handful of powers bundled in the off-the-rack provision. The
South Dakota statute, for example, grants an “investment trust advisor”
the power to sell investments by default, but not the power to sue a
trustee who refuses to comply with a direction to sell investments.71
D. The Exclusions
Because the term “power of direction” is so broad, it might swallow
some matters collateral to the emergence of directed trusts, inadvertently disrupting estate planning practices unrelated to directed trusts by
subjecting them to the fiduciary and other rules of the UDTA. As we
have already seen, every power of trusteeship is literally a “power over a
trust,”72 so the UDTA drafting committee took care to exclude powers
in a serving trustee from the scope of the act.73 In addition to this carveout for serving trustees, the UDTA includes a carefully thought-out system of five other carve-outs as well.74 These exclusions count as a major
practical innovation of the UDTA, for as we shall see, they correct unacknowledged drafting errors in many existing directed trust statutes, including the Delaware statute, that could disrupt a variety of typical
estate planning practices.
1. Nonfiduciary Powers of Appointment
The first exclusion is for nonfiduciary powers of appointment,
which are an entrenched feature of the background law of trusts that the
UDTA does not attempt to change.75 Under a power of appointment,
the person who holds the power, commonly known as a donee, may
appoint the property to one or more persons known as the objects of the
power, in accordance with the power’s terms. Consider a typical example: H devises property to X in trust to distribute the income quarterly
to W for life, and on W’s death to distribute the principal to one or more
of H’s descendants as W shall appoint by will. H is the donor of a power
of appointment, W is the donee, and H’s descendants are the objects. By
71

See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-10 (2014).
See supra Part I.A.1.
73 See supra Part I.A.2.
74 In addition to entirely exempting certain powers from the act’s coverage, the
UDTA also singles out one particular power for exemption from the fiduciary obligations
imposed on trust directors. Section 8(b) provides that if a trust director is a medical professional and acts in that capacity, the director will have no duty or liability under the act.
The power otherwise remains subject to the terms of the act, however, including the
provisions that diminish the liability of a trustee. See infra Part II.A.3.
75 See, e.g., UNIF. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT ACT § 102(13) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2013); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§§ 17.1, 17.5 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
72
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this power, which H intends W to hold in a nonfiduciary capacity, W
may decide who among H’s descendants will take the trust property at
her death. In this way, H empowers W to deal flexibly with changing
circumstances in the interim between their deaths, which may span years
or even decades.76
Powers of appointment provide benefits beyond building flexibility
into an estate plan. They are also commonly used for tax planning and
asset protection. In the example just given, because W cannot appoint
the trust property for her own benefit (in the jargon, the power is
nongeneral), no estate or gift tax will be due upon W’s exercise of the
power,77 and no creditor of W will have recourse against the property.78
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of powers of appointment in contemporary estate planning.79
Without an exclusion for nonfiduciary powers of appointment, the
risk that the UDTA could disrupt countless estate plans is readily apparent. In the example just given, the power granted to W would arguably
satisfy the UDTA’s definition of a power of direction, because it is “a
power over a trust granted to [W] by the terms of the trust.”80 Without
an exclusion, therefore, a court applying the UDTA might treat W as a
trust director subject to all the fiduciary and other rules applicable to a
director, and might treat the trustee as a directed trustee, with a lower
standard of fiduciary duty than a non-directed trustee.
This problem is not limited to the UDTA. The same disruptive result would obtain under a literal reading of the Delaware and other enabling directed trust statutes. Under the Delaware statute, arguably W
was “given authority by the terms of a governing instrument to direct . . .
a fiduciary’s . . . distribution decisions,” with the consequence that under
the statute W would be a trust adviser presumptively subject to fiduciary
duty “when exercising such authority.”81
76 Portions of this and the next paragraph are adapted without further citation or
acknowledgment from ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 807, 812 (10th ed. 2017).
77 See id. at 809–10, 813–15.
78 See id. at 815–16.
79 “The power of appointment is the most efficient dispositive device that the ingenuity of Anglo-American lawyers has ever worked out.” W. Barton Leach, Powers of
Appointment, 24 A.B.A. J. 807, 807 (1938).
80 UDTA § 2(5).
81 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(a) (2018). Under the Delaware statute, fiduciary
status is presumptive rather than mandatory. The statute says that “the governing instrument may provide that any such adviser (including a protector) shall act in a nonfiduciary
capacity.” Id. Thus, in the case posited, W could argue that the terms of the trust impliedly granted the power in a nonfiduciary capacity. Putting to the side the question of
whether the text of the statute allows for implied waiver of fiduciary status, the broader
point is that, owing to the overbreadth of the Delaware statute, the default treatment of
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The drafting committee for the UDTA anticipated this problem,
providing a categorical exclusion for nonfiduciary powers of appointment in § 5(b)(1). The exclusion works as follows. UDTA § 5(b)(1) provides that the act “does not apply to a . . . power of appointment.”
Section 5(a) defines a “power of appointment” as “a power that enables
a person acting in a nonfiduciary capacity to designate a recipient of an
ownership interest in or another power of appointment over trust property.”82 Accordingly, if the terms of a trust grant a person not serving as
trustee a nonfiduciary power to direct distributions of trust property,
under the UDTA that power will be construed as a power of appointment rather than as a power of direction and will not be subject to the
act. The holder of the power will not be a trust director, and a trustee
subject to the power will not be a directed trustee.
The exclusion prescribed by § 5(b)(1) applies only to a power of
appointment held in a nonfiduciary capacity. It does not apply to a
power of distribution held in a fiduciary capacity. Thus, if the terms of a
trust grant a person a power to direct a distribution of trust property
while the person is not serving as trustee, and the person holds the
power in a fiduciary capacity, then under the UDTA the power is a
power of direction and the person is a trust director.
To resolve doubt about whether a power over distribution is a nonfiduciary power of appointment or a fiduciary power of direction,
UDTA § 5(c) prescribes a rule of construction under which a power
over distribution in a person not serving as a trustee is presumptively a
power of appointment, and so is not held in a fiduciary capacity, unless
the terms of the trust indicate otherwise.83 This rule of construction codifies the typical expectation that would have informed the drafting of
existing trusts. For example, if the terms of a trust give the spouse of the
settlor a power to distribute trust property to the settlor’s descendants
without specifying whether the power is held in a fiduciary capacity,
under the rule of construction in UDTA § 5(c) the presumption is that
W as a fiduciary gives rise to litigation risk and potentially disrupts H’s plan. Under the
UDTA, by contrast, W’s nonfiduciary power of appointment is protected by a categorical
exclusion.
82 This definition of “power of appointment” is based on Uniform Powers of Appointment Act § 102(13) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013) (“UPAA”) and is consistent with
what RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 17.1 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2011) refers to as a “discretionary” power of appointment,
that is, one in which “the donee may exercise the power arbitrarily as long as the exercise
is within the scope of the power.”
83 See UDTA § 5(c) (“Unless the terms of a trust provide otherwise, a power
granted to a person to designate a recipient of an ownership interest in or power of
appointment over trust property which is exercisable while the person is not serving as a
trustee is a power of appointment and not a power of direction.”).
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the power is a nonfiduciary power of appointment, exempting the
spouse and the power from the act. Further, a power in a serving trustee
to designate a recipient of an ownership interest in or a power of appointment over trust property can never be a power of direction, because as we have seen, a serving trustee can never be a trust director.84
Two other points about this exclusion merit further discussion.
First, as a planning matter, the § 5(b)(1) exclusion for a nonfiduciary
power of appointment ensures that a settlor may grant to a person or a
committee of persons a power over distribution of the trust property in
either a fiduciary capacity (i.e., a power of direction subject to the
UDTA) or a nonfiduciary capacity (i.e., a nonfiduciary power of appointment excluded by § 5(b)(1)). The drafting committee reasoned
that, whatever the merits of the argument that all powers over distribution should be held in a fiduciary capacity, history has settled the question decisively in favor of allowing a settlor to grant a power over
distribution in a nonfiduciary capacity. This settled principle underpins
countless estate plans and is central to contemporary trust practice.
Second, the § 5(b)(1) exclusion for a nonfiduciary power of appointment fits tightly with the Uniform Powers of Appointment Act
(“UPAA”), which excludes fiduciary powers over distribution and applies only to a nonfiduciary power of appointment.85 Under the UPAA,
the definition of a power of appointment includes only powers that are
nonfiduciary, and a trustee or other person who has a fiduciary power
over distribution holds a fiduciary power that is distinct from a power of
appointment.86 Accordingly, within the uniform trusts and estates acts,
84 See supra Part I.A.2. Whether a power over distribution granted to a serving trustee is held in a fiduciary capacity, making it a fiduciary distributive power held in the
person’s capacity as trustee, or is instead a nonfiduciary power of appointment held by
the person individually, is governed by background law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003). By way of illustration, H might devise a
fund in trust to W, granting W both fiduciary distributive powers in W’s capacity as trustee as well as one or more lifetime or testamentary nonfiduciary powers of appointment.
85 See UPAA § 102(13). The comment explains:
In this act, a fiduciary distributive power is not a power of appointment. Fiduciary distributive powers include a trustee’s power to distribute principal to or for
the benefit of an income beneficiary, or for some other individual, or to pay
income or principal to a designated beneficiary, or to distribute income or principal among a defined group of beneficiaries. Unlike the exercise of a power of
appointment, the exercise of a fiduciary distributive power is subject to fiduciary
standards. Unlike a power of appointment, a fiduciary distributive power does
not lapse upon the death of the fiduciary, but survives in a successor fiduciary.
Nevertheless, a fiduciary distributive power, like a power of appointment, cannot be validly exercised in favor of or for the benefit of someone who is not a
permissible appointee.
Id. cmt.
86 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. a.
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the UPAA governs a nonfiduciary power of appointment; the UDTA
governs a fiduciary power over distribution in a person not serving as
trustee; and the Uniform Trust Code governs a fiduciary power over
distribution in a person serving as trustee.
2. Power to Appoint or Remove a Trustee or Trust Director
UDTA § 5(b)(2) excludes “a . . . power to appoint or remove a
trustee or trust director.”87 The drafting committee intended this exclusion to address the concern that a power to appoint or remove a trustee
is a common drafting practice that arose separately from the phenomenon of directed trusts. “Professionally drafted trusts commonly include a
provision that overrides the default law of trustee removal by authorizing the beneficiaries or a third party to remove the trustee and appoint a
successor (perhaps limited to an independent corporate trustee).”88
Under the exclusion of § 5(b)(2), such a power is not a power of direction, and the person holding the power is not a trust director. In consequence, a person who holds a power to appoint or remove a trustee is
not subject to the fiduciary duties of a trust director.
Under prevailing law, the only limit on the exercise of a power to
appoint or remove a trustee is that it “must conform to any valid requirements or limitations imposed by the trust terms.”89 If the terms of
the trust do not impose any requirements or limitations on the power to
remove, then “it is unnecessary for the holder to show cause” before
exercising the power.90
3. Power of Settlor Over a Revocable Trust
Under modern law, a trustee of a revocable trust owes its duties to
the settlor rather than to the beneficiaries.91 Moreover, because the settlor may at any time revoke the trust and take back the trust property,
the trustee must “comply with a direction of the settlor even though the
direction is contrary to the terms of the trust or the trustee’s normal
fiduciary duties.”92 In other words, under modern law every revocable
trust includes an implied term under which the trustee must comply with
87

UDTA § 5(b)(2).
SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 76, at 751.
89 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. c.
90 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER & MARK L. ASCHER,
SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 11.10.2 (5th ed. 2006).
91 See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE (hereinafter “UTC”) § 603(a) (2010) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N, amended 2018); David Feder & Robert H. Sitkoff, Revocable Trusts and Incapacity Planning: More than Just a Will Substitute, 24 ELDER L.J. 1 (2016).
92 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74(1)(a)(i) (AM. LAW INST. 2007); see also
UTC § 603(a) (amended 2018) (“To the extent a trust is revocable by a settlor, a trustee
may follow a direction of the settlor that is contrary to the terms of the trust.”).
88
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a direction from the settlor about how to administer the trust. And as a
matter of normal and customary drafting practice, this implied term is
express in many revocable trusts. A typical professionally drafted revocable trust will provide that the settlor “may direct the trustee to distribute to the settlor so much or all of the income and principal as the
settlor wishes and to invest the trust property as the settlor directs.”93
A revocable trust poses a challenge under the UDTA and other
directed trust statutes, because without a specific exclusion, a power to
revoke is arguably a power of direction. As we have seen, the UDTA
defines a “power of direction” to include any “power over a trust,”94
and since a power to revoke is a “power over a trust,” a power to revoke
would also be a power of direction. A revocable trust would therefore
become a directed trust, and a settlor would have the fiduciary duties of
a trust director while a trustee would have the lightened fiduciary duties
of a directed trustee. The drafting committee worried that transforming
revocable trusts into directed trusts in this way would upset existing
practice by upending the way settlors and trustees in these trusts relate
to each other. Accordingly, UDTA § 5(b)(3) excludes “a . . . power of a
settlor over a trust to the extent the settlor has a power to revoke the
trust.”95
Conceptually, this exclusion has much in common with the exclusion under § 5(b)(1) for a nonfiduciary power of appointment.96 A settlor’s power to revoke a revocable trust is functionally not very different
from a nonfiduciary general power of appointment.97 Moreover, as with
the § 5(b)(1) exclusion for a nonfiduciary power of appointment, the
§ 5(b)(3) exclusion for a settlor’s power over a revocable trust corrects
an unacknowledged drafting error in many existing enabling directed
trust statutes, including the Delaware statute. Under the Delaware statute, the settlor of a typically drafted revocable trust would be “given
authority by the terms of a governing instrument to direct . . . a fiduciary’s actual or proposed investment decisions, distribution decisions or
93 Feder & Sitkoff, supra note 91, at 10 (giving Northern Trust formbook as an
example).
94 UDTA § 2(5); see also supra Part I.A.1.
95 UDTA § 5(b)(3). The comment explains that the “drafting committee intended
that this exception would apply only to that portion of a trust over which the settlor has a
power to revoke, that is, ‘to the extent’ of the settlor’s power to revoke.” Id. cmt. With
respect to an agent or conservator of the settlor, the comment elaborates thus: “To the
extent that a conservator or agent of the settlor may exercise the settlor’s power to revoke, as under Uniform Trust Code § 602(e)–(f) (2001), subsection (b)(3) of this section
would apply to the conservator or agent. A nonfiduciary power in a person other than the
settlor to withdraw the trust property is a power of appointment that would fall within
subsection (b)(1).” Id.
96 See UDTA § 5(b)(1); supra Part I.D.1.
97 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2007).
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other decision of the fiduciary,” with the consequence that under a literal reading of the statute the settlor would be a trust adviser subject by
default to fiduciary duty “when exercising such authority.”98
4. Power of a Beneficiary
The definition of a “trust director” in UDTA § 2(9) includes a person who is granted a “power of direction . . . whether or not the person
is a beneficiary.”99 The definition includes a beneficiary to ensure that a
power over a trust that affects another beneficiary is not exempt from
the UDTA merely because the person who holds the power happens
also to be a beneficiary. Otherwise, the mandatory fiduciary duties of a
trust director under § 8(a)(2), discussed below,100 could be circumvented by giving the director a peppercorn beneficial interest in the
trust.
Including a beneficiary in the definition of a trust director, however, creates the possibility that a beneficiary who holds a power over a
trust might be subjected to the fiduciary duties and other obligations of
a trust director even if the power does not affect anyone other than the
beneficiary. Though it might make sense to treat a beneficiary as a trust
director when the beneficiary’s powers affect others, it does not make
sense to treat a beneficiary as a director when the beneficiary’s powers
affect only that beneficiary. To resolve this problem, UDTA § 5(b)(4)
excludes “a . . . power of a beneficiary over a trust to the extent the
exercise or nonexercise of the power affects the beneficial interest of . . .
(A) the beneficiary[,] or (B) another beneficiary represented by the
beneficiary [under applicable virtual representation law] with respect to
the exercise or nonexercise of the power.”101
Subparagraph (A) of this exclusion is consistent with traditional
law, under which “[a] power that is for the sole benefit of the person
holding the power is not a fiduciary power.”102 For example, a power in
a beneficiary to release a trustee from a claim by the beneficiary is excluded by § 5(b)(4)(A). To the extent the power affects another person,
however, then it is not for the sole benefit of the person holding the
power. Accordingly, a power over a trust held by a beneficiary may be a
“power of direction” if it affects the beneficial interest of another beneficiary. For example, a power in a beneficiary to release the trustee from
a claim by another beneficiary is not excluded by § 5(b)(4) unless the
98

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(a) (2018).
UDTA § 2(9).
100 See infra Part II.A.1.
101 UDTA § 5(b)(4).
102 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. d; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 185 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (similar).
99
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power to bind the other beneficiary arises by reason of virtual representation so that subparagraph (B) applies.
The same rules apply if the beneficiary’s power is jointly held. For
example, if the terms of a trust provide that a trustee may be released
from liability by a majority of the beneficiaries, and a majority of the
beneficiaries grants such a release, then those beneficiaries would be
acting as trust directors to the extent the release bound other beneficiaries other than by virtual representation. In this respect the UDTA
would reverse the result in Vena v. Vena,103 in which the court refused
to enforce a provision for release of a trustee by a majority of the beneficiaries on the grounds that the minority beneficiaries did not have recourse against the majority for an abusive release. Under UDTA § 8,
discussed below, the minority beneficiaries would have recourse against
the majority for breach of their fiduciary duty as trust directors.
The carve-out for virtual representation in subparagraph (B) reflects the drafting committee’s intent not to impose the fiduciary rules of
this act on top of the law of virtual representation, which contains its
own limits and safeguards. Without subparagraph (B), the capacious
definition of “power of direction” in Section 2 could have been read to
transform a beneficiary who represented another beneficiary by virtual
representation into a trust director.104
Like the exclusions for powers of appointment and revocable
trusts,105 this exclusion for the self-affecting power of a beneficiary represents a practical improvement on existing statutes. Many existing statutes fail to exclude these kinds of powers. In Delaware, for example, any
beneficiary who has a power “to direct, consent to or disapprove a fiduciary’s actual or proposed . . . decision” is presumed to be a trust advisor, even if the beneficiary’s powers affect no one other than the
beneficiary and even if the power arises by reason of virtual
representation.106
103

899 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
The comment elaborates:
By way of illustration, under Uniform Trust Code § 304 (2000), a beneficiary
who suffers from an incapacitating case of Alzheimer’s disease may sometimes
be represented by another beneficiary in litigation against a trustee for breach
of trust. In such a case, paragraph (4) of this section prevents the beneficiary
who represents the beneficiary with Alzheimer’s from being a trust director.
Instead, the safeguards provided by the law of virtual representation will apply.
Under § 304, for example, the representative beneficiary and the beneficiary
with Alzheimer’s disease must have “a substantially identical interest with respect to the particular question or dispute,” and have “no conflict of interest”
with each other.
UDTA § 5(b)(4) cmt.
105 See supra Part I.D.1, 3.
106 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(a) (2018).
104

Winter 2019]

MAKING DIRECTED TRUSTS WORK

29

5. The Settlor’s Tax Objectives
The final exclusion in UDTA § 5 protects against disruption of normal and customary tax planning. UDTA § 5(b)(5) excludes “a . . . power
over a trust if . . . the terms of the trust provide that the power is held in
a nonfiduciary capacity . . . and the power must be held in a nonfiduciary
capacity to achieve the settlor’s [federal] tax objectives.”107 The drafting
committee intended this exclusion to address the concern that certain
powers held by a person other than a trustee must be nonfiduciary to
achieve the settlor’s federal tax objectives.108
Perhaps the most salient example is a power to substitute assets
meant to ensure grantor trust tax status. To ensure that a trust is a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes, planners commonly include in
the terms of the trust a provision that allows the settlor to substitute
assets of the trust for assets of an equivalent value, exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity.109 The power to substitute assets must be held in a
nonfiduciary capacity to ensure grantor trust status. If the power is exercisable in a fiduciary capacity, the power will not cause the trust to be a
grantor trust.
The problem is that, as we shall see below, UDTA § 8 mandates
that all trust directors are fiduciaries.110 Without the exclusion under
§ 5(b)(5), therefore, the common drafting practice of a nonfiduciary
power to substitute assets would be impossible. The tax status of existing
trusts with such a provision would be thrown into disarray. The exclusion solves this problem by ensuring that any power over a trust that is
nonfiduciary under the terms of the trust and must be nonfiduciary to
107

UDTA § 5(b)(5) (bracketed text in original).
See UDTA § 5(b)(5) cmt. The comment explains why the limitation covers only
federal tax objectives and not state tax objectives:
The drafting committee deliberately opted to reference tax objectives only
under federal law, thereby excluding tax objectives under state law. The concern
was that some states levy a tax on income in a trust if the trust has a fiduciary in
the state. If this exclusion reached state tax law, then in such a state a trust
director could argue that the director is not a fiduciary, because the settlor
would not have wanted the trust to pay income tax. The consequence would be
to negate fiduciary status for virtually all trust directors in those states. The
purpose of this exception is to protect normal and customary estate planning
techniques, not to allow circumvention of the central policy choice encoded in
Section 8 that a trust director is generally subject to the same default and
mandatory fiduciary duties as a similarly situated trustee.
109 See, e.g., David R. York & Eric B. Whiting, Basis Basics and Beyond: Strategies
for Estate Planners, 44 EST. PLAN. 14, 19 (2017) (“In most IDGTs [i.e., intentionally defective grantor trusts], the grantor retains the ability to substitute assets of equivalent
value.”).
110 UDTA § 8(a); infra Part II.A.1.
108
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achieve the settlor’s federal tax objectives will remain nonfiduciary even
after adoption of the UDTA.
In light of the evolving nature of tax planning, the frequency of
amendments to the tax law, and the potential for disagreement about
which powers must be nonfiduciary to achieve the settlor’s federal tax
objectives, the drafting committee reasoned that a standard referring
broadly to a settlor’s federal tax objectives was preferable to a prescribed list of sections of the tax code.111
This exclusion is also a significant practical innovation on existing
statutes. None of the leading directed trust jurisdictions—Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, New Hampshire, or South Dakota—has an exclusion for
a power that would upset a settlor’s tax planning. Some states, such as
Missouri, have tried to solve tax problems by prohibiting a trust director
from exercising certain powers.112 But a statutory list may not be complete and can swiftly be rendered stale by changes in the tax law.
E. Choice of Law and Prospective Application
Two final practical details regarding the scope of the UDTA merit
attention: (1) choice of law, and (2) prospective application.
1. Choice of Law
On the reasoning that powers and duties in a directed trust are matters of trust administration,113 UDTA § 3(a) follows the prevailing conflict of laws rule by linking application of the UDTA to a trust’s
principal place of administration.114 If a trust’s principal place of administration is in state X and state X has enacted the UDTA, then the
UDTA as enacted in X applies to the trust. But how is a trust’s principal
place of administration to be determined?
Under UDTA § 3(b), terms of a directed trust that “designate the
principal place of administration of the trust are valid and controlling” if
(1) a trustee is located in the designated jurisdiction, (2) a trust director
is located in the designated jurisdiction, or (3) at least some of the trust
administration occurs in the designated jurisdiction. This provision establishes a safe harbor for a settlor’s designation of the principal place
of administration for a directed trust. Subsections (b)(1) and (b)(3)
reproduce without change the safe harbor prescribed by Uniform Trust
Code § 108(a) (2000). Subsection (b)(2) expands the safe harbor of
111
112
113

See UDTA § 5(b)(5) cmt.
See MO. REV. STAT. § 456.8-808(4), (5) (2018).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 271 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.

1971).
114 See UDTA § 3(a) (“This [act] applies to a trust . . . that has its principal place of
administration in this state.”).
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§ 108(a) to add the presence of a trust director as a sufficient connection
with the designated jurisdiction.
Other than the expansion in UDTA § 3(b)(2) of the Uniform Trust
Code’s safe harbor for a settlor’s designation of a trust’s principal place
of administration, the drafting committee did not undertake to prescribe
rules for ascertaining a trust’s principal place of administration. In this
respect, the drafting committee followed the Uniform Trust Code in
“not attempt[ing] to further define principal place of administration.”115
Accordingly, for a directed trust in a state that enacts the UDTA, just as
for all trusts in a Uniform Trust Code state, if the safe harbor does not
apply, the question of a trust’s principal place of administration will be
governed by the state’s existing law on principal place of
administration.116
2. Prospective Application
UDTA § 3(a) applies the act to all trusts administered in an enacting state regardless of whether the trust was in existence on the effective
date of this act. However, under § 3(a)(1)-(2), the act applies only with
respect to a decision or action occurring on or after the effective date or,
if the trust’s principal place of administration was changed to the enacting state after the effective date, only with respect to a decision or action
occurring on or after that change. As we will see, some of the standards
of conduct prescribed by the UDTA depart from the common law as
reflected in the Restatements of Trusts and from the standards prescribed by the Uniform Trust Code.117 The drafting committee therefore
reasoned in accordance with due process norms that the act should not
apply to actions undertaken in reliance on prior law.118
II. ALLOCATING FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY

IN A

DIRECTED TRUST

The core of the UDTA’s contribution appears in §§ 8 through 11 of
the Act, which allocate fiduciary responsibility among trust directors
and directed trustees. The UDTA’s basic approach is to place the primary fiduciary responsibility for a power on the person who holds the
power. If a power belongs to a trust director, then the primary fiduciary
responsibility for that power belongs to the director, rather than the directed trustee who merely facilitates the director’s exercise of the
115

UTC § 108 cmt.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 271–72, 279 (AM.
LAW INST. 1971).
117 See, e.g., infra Part II.A–B.
118 In this respect the UDTA follows UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT § 11 (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1994). The UDTA also minimizes disturbance of existing trusts by not creating
new powers by default, as we have seen. See supra Part I.B.2.
116

32

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:3

power. The UDTA thus relieves a directed trustee from the full fiduciary duties of a unitary trusteeship, and leaves a directed trustee with
only a reduced duty to avoid “willful misconduct” in deciding whether
to comply with a director’s directions.
In making a trust director the primary bearer of fiduciary responsibility for his or her power, the UDTA employs the novel and technically
innovative strategy of absorbing the existing fiduciary law of trusteeship.
In most instances, the UDTA applies to a trust director the same fiduciary duties that would apply to a trustee in a like position and under
similar circumstances. In addition, the UDTA prescribes clear rules that
negate any duty of cross-monitoring among trust directors and trustees
while at the same requiring trust directors and trustees to share
information.
In its overarching concept and the details of its execution, the
UDTA represents a dramatic improvement on the fiduciary rules of the
existing directed trust statutes. The UDTA is both more complete and
more precise in its fiduciary regime than Delaware or any other state.
The UDTA’s fiduciary regime is also adaptable to every state. Although
the UDTA follows the Delaware model of applying a standard of “willful misconduct” to a directed trustee, the provision that applies the willful misconduct standard could be altered to meet the policy desires of
states that prefer no fiduciary duty for a directed trustee, such as South
Dakota, New Hampshire, and Nevada. Similarly, states that want to
eliminate the mandatory minimum duties of a trust director can do so.
Regardless of its preferences on the allocation of fiduciary duties, any
state can achieve its preferences with a few modifications while still enjoying the many practical innovations of the UDTA.
A. Trust Directors (UDTA § 8)
The first issue the drafting committee took up in the UDTA was the
fiduciary duty of a trust director. Should a trust director’s duty in the
exercise or nonexercise of its powers be the same as a trustee? Some
different level or form of duty? Or perhaps no duty at all? In answering
these questions, the drafting committee was deeply influenced by a survey of the existing directed trust statues, which showed a remarkable
unanimity on these questions. The great majority of state directed trust
statutes treat a trust director as a fiduciary of some kind.119
119 Many states treat a trust director as a fiduciary by mandate, while others only
impose fiduciary status by default. Still others impose fiduciary duties on some categories
of directors by default and on other categories of directors by mandate. For states that
impose fiduciary duties by mandate, see, e.g., 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.3(e) (2015) (“A
directing party is a fiduciary of the trust subject to the same duties and standards applicable to a trustee of a trust as provided by applicable law unless the governing instrument
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Treating a trust director as a fiduciary makes sense, because a trust
director is, by definition, a person with a power over a trust. Power and
duty are deeply connected in trust fiduciary law,120 and it seems selfevident that the person who has a power over a trust is in the best position to bear the primary fiduciary responsibility for that power. Accordingly, the UDTA’s basic approach is to treat a trust director like a
trustee with respect to the director’s powers. A trust director bears the
provides otherwise, but the governing instrument may not, however, relieve or exonerate
a directing party from the duty to act or withhold acting as the directing party in good
faith reasonably believes is in the best interests of the trust.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 564-B:12-1202(a) (2014) (“Notwithstanding the breadth of discretion granted to a trust
advisor or trust protector under the terms of the trust, including the use of such terms as
‘absolute,’ ‘sole,’ or ‘uncontrolled,’ a trust advisor or trust protector must exercise a discretionary power and otherwise act in good faith and in accordance with the terms of the
trust, the purposes of the trust, and the interests of the beneficiaries.”); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.2-770(E)(1) (2014) (“Notwithstanding anything in the trust instrument to the contrary, the trust director shall be deemed a fiduciary who, as such, is required to act in
good faith with regard to the purposes of the trust and the interests of the
beneficiaries.”).
Other states impose fiduciary duties on trust directors only by default. Delaware, for
example, makes a trust director a fiduciary by default, but also permits a “governing
instrument [to] provide that any such [director] shall act in a nonfiduciary capacity.” DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(a) (2018); see also In re Ronald J. Mount, 2012 Irrev. Dynasty
Tr. U/A/D Dec. 5, 2012, No. CV 12892-VCS, 2017 WL 4082886 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2017)
(dismissing a complaint against a trust director after finding that the terms of the trust
provided that the director acted in a nonfiduciary capacity). One strange (and possibly
unintended) consequence of making a director’s duties a default is that the terms of a
trust can give a trust director even less fiduciary duty than it can give the directed trustee
who carries out the director’s directions. Under a literal reading of Delaware’s statute, a
trust director can be freed from fiduciary duty entirely, but a directed trustee is subject to
a mandatory minimum duty to avoid “wilful misconduct” even when the directed trustee
is merely complying with the director’s directions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(b), (c);
see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3303(a) (prohibiting exculpation or indemnification
for “wilful misconduct”).
Some states impose fiduciary duties by default on some directors and by mandate on
others. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-1B-1(2), (6), (7) (2018) (imposing no fiduciary duties on a “trust protector” by default while imposing fiduciary duties on an “investment trust advisor” and “distribution trust advisor” by mandate).
120 The Restatement characterizes this as “a basic principle of trust administration,”
namely, that “a trustee presumptively has comprehensive powers to manage the trust
estate and otherwise to carry out the terms and purpose of the trust, but that all powers
held in the capacity of trustee must be exercised, or not exercised, in accordance with the
trustee’s fiduciary obligations.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 70 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 2007). Thus, “even a power expressly conferred by the trust instrument, or by statute, is subject to the fundamental duties of prudence, loyalty, and impartiality, to a duty
to adhere to the terms of the trust, and to the other fiduciary duties of trusteeship.” Id.;
see also UTC § 815(b) (“The exercise of a power is subject to the fiduciary duties prescribed by this [article].”).
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same default and mandatory fiduciary duties as a trustee in a like position and under similar circumstances.
1. Absorption of Trustee Duties
The UDTA implements the policy that a trust director is a fiduciary
in § 8. The basic rule of § 8(a) is that “a trust director has the same
fiduciary duty and liability” as a “trustee in a like position and under
similar circumstances.”121 If the director holds the power individually,
then the director bears the fiduciary duty of a sole trustee.122 If the director holds the power jointly with a trustee or another director, the
director bears the fiduciary duty of a cotrustee.123
With respect to the default or mandatory character of a trust director’s duties, UDTA § 8(a)(2) provides that “the terms of the trust may
vary the director’s duty or liability to the same extent the terms of the
trust could vary the duty or liability of a trustee in a like position and
under similar circumstances.”124 In other words, duties that are default
for a trustee are default for a similarly situated trust director, and duties
that are mandatory for a trustee are mandatory for a similarly situated
trust director. If the terms of a trust include an exoneration clause or
grant of extended discretion, those terms would have the same effect on
the duty and liability of the director as they would for a trustee. If they
go too far, they would be ineffective.125
The strategy of trust director fiduciary duty under the UDTA is
thus one of absorption. The UDTA absorbs for a trust director the same
law of fiduciary duty that would apply to a similarly situated trustee.
Because a trust director exercises a power over a trust like a trustee, a
trust director bears the same fiduciary duties as a trustee in the exercise
of those powers.
In absorbing the fiduciary law of trusteeship, the UDTA offers a
practical improvement on the existing statutes. Although almost all
states treat a trust director as a fiduciary (at least by default), they neglect to specify which kind of fiduciary a trust director is supposed to be.
They tend to say that a trust director is a “fiduciary” without saying
whether a trust director bears specifically the fiduciary duties of a trus121

UDTA § 8(a)(1).
Id. § 8(a)(1)(A).
123 Id. § 8(a)(1)(B).
124 Id. § 8(a)(2).
125 On extended discretion, see UTC § 814(a) (amended 2004); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003). On exoneration, see UTC § 1008
(amended 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 (AM. LAW INST. 2012). Of
course, the UDTA allows the terms of a trust to impose additional duties on a trust
director. See UDTA § 8(c).
122
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tee.126 Most states thus leave open the question of what the fiduciary
duties of a trust director will entail and how a settlor, trust director,
directed trustee, or judge might discern them.
The UDTA solves these problems by expressly analogizing a trust
director to a trustee.127 The duty of a trust director is the duty of a trustee in a like position and under similar circumstances. The fiduciary duties of trusteeship apply to a trust director, provided that they would
apply to a trustee with similar powers under similar circumstances.
Specifically absorbing the fiduciary duties of a trustee offers several
advantages. The first is certainty. Under the UDTA, courts and the parties to a trust will not have to guess about which fiduciary law applies to
a directed trustee, because the statute expressly absorbs the fiduciary
duties of trusteeship. A closely related advantage is that absorbing the
fiduciary duties of trusteeship avoids the need to spell out an entire fiduciary law for trust directors in complete detail. By drawing on the fiduciary duties of trusteeship, the UDTA avoids the need to duplicate for
trust directors something like Article 8 of the Uniform Trust Code.
Another advantage of absorbing the fiduciary law of trusteeship is
to accommodate variation across the states in the particulars of a trustee’s default and mandatory fiduciary duties, such as the duties to diversify and to give information to beneficiaries, both of which have become
increasingly differentiated across the states.128 Thus, in a state that allows the terms of a trust to negate a trustee’s duty to give information to
a beneficiary, the terms of a trust could likewise negate that duty for a
trust director.129 Absorption also allows for changes to the duties of a
trustee to be applied automatically into the duties of a trust director.
State legislatures will face no need for regular conforming revisions to
the UDTA.
2. Sensitivity to Context
Although the UDTA absorbs the fiduciary duties of a trustee, those
duties apply to a trust director as they would to a trustee “in a like position and under similar circumstances.”130 Rather than treating all trust
directors identically, therefore, a court must be sensitive to the peculiar
circumstances of each. In some circumstances, applying the fiduciary law
126 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-8-1202(a) (1972 annotated) (“A trust advisor or
trust protector, other than a beneficiary, is a fiduciary with respect to each power granted
to the trust advisor or trust protector.”).
127 UDTA § 8.
128 See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 76, at 653–54 (diversification), 681–82
(information).
129 This result obtains under UDTA § 8(a)(2).
130 Id. § 8(a)(1).
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of trusteeship will require sensitivity to the position of a director who
may be required by the terms of a trust to act differently from a conventional trustee. The comment to § 8 gives this guidance: “In assessing the
actions of a director that holds a power to modify a trust, . . . a court
should apply the standards of loyalty and prudence in a manner that is
appropriate to the particular context, including the trust’s terms and
purposes and the director’s particular powers.”131 The comment
elaborates:
Courts have long applied the duties of loyalty and prudence
across a wide array of circumstances, including many different
kinds of trusts as well as other fiduciary relationships, such as
corporations and agencies. Fiduciary principles are thus amenable to application in a context-specific manner that is sensitive to the particular circumstances and structure of each
directed trust.132
As part of this flexibility and sensitivity to context, the drafting
committee contemplated that a settlor could construct a trust director’s
power to be springing. That is, a trust director’s duties could arise at a
particular moment, rather than applying continuously, such that the director would not be under a constant obligation to monitor the administration of a trust. By way of example, the comment to § 8 explains that
“a settlor could grant a trust director a power to direct a distribution,
but only if the director was requested to do so by a beneficiary. A director holding such a power would not be under a duty to act unless requested to do so by a beneficiary.”133
3. Exclusions
Recall that UDTA § 5 excludes certain powers from the scope of
the act: a power of appointment, a power to remove a trustee or trust
director, a power in a settlor in a revocable trust, a power in a beneficiary that affects only that beneficiary’s interest, and a power that must be
held in a nonfiduciary capacity to achieve a settlor’s federal tax objectives.134 Because the UDTA does not apply to these powers, the holder
of such a power is not a trust director subject under § 8 to the fiduciary
duties of a similarly situated trustee.
In addition to these categorical exclusions, UDTA § 8(b) carves out
from fiduciary duty and liability under the act a trust director who is a
131
132
133
134

Id. cmt.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part I.D.
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medical professional acting in the professional’s capacity as such.135 For
example, a power in a physician to determine a settlor’s mental capacity
or a beneficiary’s sobriety is a power of direction, and the physician is a
trust director, but the physician would have “no duty or liability under”
the UDTA in exercising this power.
This exclusion should offer significant comfort to doctors and other
medical professionals who might be asked by a settlor to exercise a
power over a trust and might otherwise “refuse appointment as a trust
director if such service would expose the professional to fiduciary duty
under this act.”136 Crucially, however, “the professional would remain
subject to any rules otherwise applicable to the professional, such as the
rules of medical ethics. . . . Moreover, a trustee subject to a direction by
a health-care professional is still subject to the duties under § 9 to take
reasonable action to comply with the professional’s direction and to
avoid willful misconduct in doing so.”137
The exclusion for a medical professional from duty or liability
under the UDTA is yet another of the UDTA’s many practical innovations. Many existing state statutes have unwittingly created liability risk
for family physicians and other actors unintentionally swept into the
definition of trust director.138 The UDTA avoids such overbreadth.
4. Rules for Charitable and Supplemental Needs Trusts
The UDTA also addresses “a payback provision in the terms of a
trust necessary to comply with the reimbursement requirements of
Medicaid law” as well as “a charitable interest in the trust.” For these
matters, § 7 imposes all the same “rules” that would apply to “a trustee
in a like position and under similar circumstances.”139
This provision counts as yet another practical refinement of the
UDTA, one that protects against avoidance of state-level policy limits
on trustee action in such a trust. For example, many states require a
trustee to give notice to the Attorney General before taking certain ac135

The relevant provision is as follows:
Unless the terms of a trust provide otherwise, if a trust director is licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized or permitted by law other than this [act] to provide
health care in the ordinary course of the director’s business or practice of a
profession, to the extent the director acts in that capacity, the director has no
duty or liability under this [act].
UDTA § 8(b).
136 Id. § 8 cmt.
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., Feder & Sitkoff, supra note 91, at 31–32 (noting the typicality of trust
provisions naming a physician to determine capacity, quoting Northern Trust formbook
as an example).
139 UDTA § 7.
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tions with respect to a charitable interest in a trust. Some states also
disempower a trustee from taking certain actions with respect to a
payback provision in a trust meant to comply with the reimbursement
requirements of Medicaid law.
The drafting committee referenced “rules” rather than “duties” in
§ 7 to make clear that the section absorbs every provision of state law in
the areas specified, regardless of whether the law in these areas is classified as a duty, a limit on a trustee’s powers, a regulation, or otherwise.
In referencing rules, rather than duties, § 7 stands in contrast to § 8.
Whereas the use of the term “duty” in § 8 is intended to absorb only
obligations of a fiduciary nature, § 7 absorbs all rules, whether fiduciary,
regulatory, or otherwise—but only in the two limited subject areas enumerated in § 7, rather than the whole range of a director’s possible
conduct.
5. Potential for Adaptation
Although the UDTA makes the duties of a trust director
mandatory, the mandatory character of those duties is not central to the
UDTA’s architecture. The broader structure of the UDTA is also consistent with the desire of some states to make the duty of a trust director
into a default.140 A state that wishes to make the duty of a trust director
into a default rule could adapt the UDTA with just a few small
modifications.
Modifying the UDTA in this way might be appealing because it
would allow a state to benefit from the many practical innovations in the
UDTA without compromising on the state’s basic policy preferences.
There is little else about the UDTA that should be controversial besides
the fiduciary liability of a trust director and directed trustee. The many
innovations canvassed in Part I in the scope and exclusions of the
UDTA, for example, are beneficial no matter how a state wishes to
structure the duty of a directed trustee.
B. Directed Trustees (UDTA § 9)
In a directed trust, the trust director is not the only fiduciary at
work. A directed trust also includes a directed trustee—and the fiduciary duty of a directed trustee is perhaps the most controversial issue in
the law of directed trusts. The duty of a directed trustee has attracted
immense debate, because the appropriate level of duty is not obvious.141
On the one hand, the authority to exercise a power of direction belongs
to a trust director, not a trustee. On the other hand, the actions that
140
141

See UDTA § 8 cmt.; supra note 119 and text accompanying.
See supra note 5 and text accompanying.
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make the power of direction effective must often be taken by the trustee. If a director decides to sell trust property, for example, typically it is
the trustee, as legal title holder, who must execute the transaction. The
question thus arises, what is the fiduciary responsibility, if any, of a directed trustee in taking a directed action?
1. Existing Standards
When the drafting committee surveyed the approaches of existing
directed trust statutes, a few trends emerged. The first was that the approach of Uniform Trust Code § 808, which has since been withdrawn as
superseded by the UDTA, had failed.142 UTC § 808(b) provided,
If the terms of a trust confer upon a person other than the
settlor of a revocable trust power to direct certain actions of
the trustee, the trustee shall act in accordance with an exercise
of the power unless the attempted exercise is manifestly contrary to the terms of the trust or the trustee knows the attempted exercise would constitute a serious breach of a
fiduciary duty that the person holding the power owes to the
beneficiaries of the trust.143
The failure of this provision, which was an effort to weaken somewhat
the common law duties of a directed trustee,144 is evident in its profound
142 In April of 2018, the ULC amended the UTC to delete § 808(b) and replace it
with a legislative note pointing to the UDTA. See UTC § 808 (amended 2018).
143 UTC § 808(b) (amended 2010).
144 On the common law, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 (AM. LAW INST.
2007) (“[I]f the terms of a trust reserve to the settlor or confer upon another a power to
direct or otherwise control certain conduct of the trustee, the trustee has a duty to act in
accordance with the requirements of the trust provision reserving or conferring the
power and to comply with any exercise of that power, unless the attempted exercise is
contrary to the terms of the trust or power or the trustee knows or has reason to believe
that the attempted exercise violates a fiduciary duty that the power holder owes to the
beneficiaries.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (“If
under the terms of the trust a person has power to control the action of the trustee in
certain respects, the trustee is under a duty to act in accordance with the exercise of such
power, unless the attempted exercise of the power violates the terms of the trust or is a
violation of a fiduciary duty to which such person is subject in the exercise of the
power.”).
The prevailing view in practice is that the common law as typified by the Restatements “is not comforting to directed trustees because they must devote resources to ensure that the directing person is not violating the terms of the trust or a fiduciary duty.”
Nenno, supra note 9, at 46 (emphasis removed). Under the common law, “the trustee has
a duty to police the actions of the holder of a power in a fiduciary capacity. . . . The
trustee has a duty to investigate whether the adviser is violating his duty or breaching the
trust. Thus, a trustee should not adopt an attitude of complaisance and patient waiting.”
Peter J. Brennan, Trustee and Investment Adviser: Some Dangers and Alternatives in Relationship, TR. & EST., Mar. 1961, at 243.
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unpopularity. Although § 808(b) remains in force in various states that
adopted it as part of a wholesale enactment of the Uniform Trust
Code,145 the UDTA drafting committee found that no state that had
undertaken to legislate specifically on the topic of directed trusts had
adopted the § 808(b) standard, and many states that had adopted the
UTC had altered § 808(b) to provide for a different standard.146 In
other words, every state that had legislated specifically on the duty of a
directed trustee had chosen a standard other than that prescribed by
UTC § 808(b).
The UTC § 808(b) standard was therefore not a serious contender
for the UDTA. Instead, the debate within the UDTA drafting committee centered on two possibilities that had clearly emerged as the main
alternatives in the state directed trust statutes.
One alternative provides that a directed trustee has no duty or liability for complying with an exercise of a power of direction. If we read
this kind of statute literally, a directed trustee is never liable for complying with a trust director’s exercise of a power of direction, even if the
exercise constitutes a breach of the trust director’s fiduciary duties, and
even if the directed trustee knows this.147 For example, if a trust director
has a power to sell certain trust property and the director orders the
trustee to sell the property to the director’s spouse at a bargain price in
breach of the director’s duty, then under a literal reading of the statutes
that impose no duty on a directed trustee, the trustee faces no liability
for deeding the property to the director’s spouse, even if the trustee
knows that the sale is a breach of the director’s duty. The states that
adopt this no-duty form of statute include Alaska, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South Dakota.148
The policy rationale for this first group of statutes is that duty
should follow power. If a director has the exclusive authority to exercise
The drafters of UTC § 808(b) qualified the common law as reflected in the Restatements by adding the terms “manifestly” and “serious.” UTC § 808(b) (amended 2010).
The official comment to UTC § 808 explains that it was meant to impose “only minimal
oversight responsibility on the trustee.” Id. § 808 cmt. Nevertheless, as received in practice, this provision—specifically the added qualifiers of “manifestly” and “serious”—were
feared to offer only illusory protection. “For the most part, UTC § 808(b) . . . is no more
helpful to directed trustees than [the] Restatement.” Nenno, supra note 9, at 46 (emphasis removed).
145 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 130.685 (2017); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7778 (2006);
TEX. PROP. CODE. ANN. § 114.003 (West 2018).
146 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10808 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 456.8808(8 (2018); UTAH CODE. ANN. § 75-7-906 (LexisNexis 2018).
147 There is reason to doubt that courts will read such a statute literally. See infra
notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
148 ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.375(c) (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.5549 (2009); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:8-808 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-2 (2018).
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a power of direction, then the director should be the exclusive bearer of
fiduciary duty for the power. Advocates of this approach say that placing the exclusive duty on a director does not diminish the total duty
owed to a beneficiary, because a settlor of a directed trust could have
chosen to make the trust director the sole trustee instead. Thus, on
greater-includes-the-lesser reasoning, a settlor who could have named a
trust director to serve instead as a trustee should also be able to give the
trust director the duties of the trustee. Under these no duty statutes, a
beneficiary’s only recourse for misconduct by a trust director is an action against the director.
In the second group of statutes, a directed trustee is not liable for
complying with a direction of a trust director unless by doing so the
directed trustee would personally engage in “willful” or “intentional”
misconduct. Whether a trustee is liable for selling trust property at a
bargain price to a director’s spouse, for example, depends on whether
the sale would count as “willful misconduct” on the part of the directed
trustee. The group of states with a willful misconduct or similar standard
includes Delaware, Illinois, Texas, and Virginia.149
The policy rationale for the willful misconduct statutes is that, because a trustee stands at the center of a trust, the trustee must bear at
least some duty even if the trustee is acting under the direction of a trust
director. Although a settlor could have made a trust director the sole
trustee, the settlor of a directed trust did not actually do so—and under
traditional understandings of trust fiduciary law, a trustee must always
be accountable to a beneficiary in some way.150
The states in this second group also recognize, however, that to facilitate a settlor’s intent that a trust director rather than a directed trustee is to be the primary or even sole decision-maker regarding a power
of direction, it is appropriate to reduce the level of a directed trustee’s
duty below the level that would usually apply to a non-directed trustee
to the extent the directed trustee acts subject to a power of direction.
Accordingly, under the “willful misconduct” statutes, a beneficiary’s
main recourse for misconduct by a trust director is an action against the
director. But the beneficiary also has recourse against the trustee to the
extent that the trustee’s compliance with the director’s exercise of his
powers amounted to “willful misconduct” by the trustee.
149 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313 (2018); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.3(f) (2015);
TEX. PROP. CODE. ANN. § 114.003; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-770 (2014).
150 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2012)
(“Notwithstanding the breadth of language in a trust provision relieving a trustee from
liability for breach of trust, for reasons of policy trust fiduciary law imposes limitations on
the types and degree of misconduct for which the trustee can be excused from liability.”).
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Relative to a non-directed trust, this second approach has the effect
of increasing the total fiduciary duties owed to a beneficiary. All of the
usual duties of trusteeship are preserved in the trust director, but in addition, the directed trustee is under a duty to avoid willful misconduct.
2. The UDTA’s Willful Misconduct Standard
After extensive debate, the drafting committee opted to follow the
second group of statutes. UDTA § 9(a) provides that “the trustee is not
liable” for taking “reasonable action to comply with a trust director’s
exercise or nonexercise of a power of direction” except as provided in
§ 9(b).151 Section 9(b), in turn, provides that a “directed trustee must
not comply with a trust director’s exercise or nonexercise of a power of
direction . . . to the extent that by complying the trustee would engage in
willful misconduct.”152 The UDTA thus generally requires a trustee to
comply with a director’s direction and relieves the trustee from liability
for so doing, unless by complying with the direction the trustee would
engage in willful misconduct, in which case the trustee has a duty not to
comply.
The drafting committee opted for the willful misconduct standard
over a complete abolition of duty for several reasons. One was that the
committee considered willful misconduct more consistent with traditional fiduciary policy. The willful misconduct standard preserves a minimum of duty for a trustee and thus maintains the traditional notion that
a trustee is a fiduciary.
The committee also feared that the promise of the no duty statutes
might ultimately prove false. Even if a statute provides no fiduciary duty
for a directed trustee, a court can almost always find some source of
duty otherwise, as judges may resist the notion that a trustee can have
zero responsibility with respect to some matter of trust administration.
In Rollins v. Branch Banking & Trust Company of Virginia, for example, the court found no breach of a duty for a directed trustee’s failure to
question an investment director’s concentration of the trust’s portfolio,
but the court still held the directed trustee liable for failing to inform the
trust’s beneficiaries of the risks of the director’s concentration.153 Like
many other directed trust statutes, the UDTA specifically disavows the
151

UDTA § 9(a).
Id. § 9(b).
153 56 Va. Cir. 147 (2002); see also Jo Ann Howard & Assoc., P.C. v. Cassity, 868 F.3d
637, 647 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that, although applicable statute contained language that
purported to “relieve[ ]” trustee of “all liability regarding investment decisions” by investment advisor, a “trustee always has a duty to ensure that trust assets are invested
prudently, whether the trustee is investing the assets himself or monitoring the investment decisions of an investment advisor”).
152
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Rollins duty to inform.154 But the court’s resistence to a trustee without
fiduciary duty is telling. The committee thus decided that the more honest approach, and possibly the more protective of a directed trustee, was
to mandate a willful misconduct standard, rather than inviting judges to
search for substitute kinds of duties ad hoc.
The drafting committee was also persuaded by the popularity of
directed trusts in Delaware, which pioneered the willful misconduct
standard. Delaware’s success with the willful misconduct standard establishes that a directed trust regime that preserves a willful misconduct
safeguard is workable and does not excessively interfere with settlor autonomy. A total elimination of duty in a directed trustee is unnecessary
to satisfy the needs of directed trust practice.
In adopting a “willful misconduct” standard, the UDTA drafting
committee made the further decision not to define the standard. The
UDTA therefore does not provide a definition of what “willful misconduct” means. In this regard, the UDTA stands in contrast to Delaware,
which provides that “wilful misconduct shall mean intentional wrongdoing, not mere negligence, gross negligence or recklessness and ‘wrongdoing’ means malicious conduct or conduct designed to defraud or seek
an unconscionable advantage.”155
The UDTA drafting committee chose not to define the standard for
two main reasons. First, the committee took notice of the great variation
in definitions of “willful misconduct” across the states and across legal
contexts. Second, the committee concluded that, given that directed
trusts vary widely and trust directors’ real-world exercises of their powers may vary even more widely, the fleshing out of the meaning of “willful conduct” should be left open for the courts. The drafting committee
thus decided to preserve room for judges to elaborate the willful misconduct standard in application—perhaps (but not necessarily) by defining it the same way as Delaware. In choosing not to include an express
definition of willful misconduct, the UDTA keeps company with most of
the existing state statutes that provide for a willful misconduct or similar
standard, which likewise do not provide an express definition.156 Even
Delaware did not define willful misconduct when it first adopted the
standard, adding it later and applying it to the use of that standard
across its trust code.157
154

UDTA § 11; see infra Part II.D.1.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3301(g) (2018).
156 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-16-807(1) (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-906(4),
5(b) (LexisNexis 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-770(E)(2) (2014); WIS. STAT. § 701.0808
(2014).
157 Delaware adopted the willful misconduct standard for directed trusts in 1994, 69
Del. Laws 279 (1994), and the definition for all uses of the term across its trust code in
2010. 77 Del. Laws 330 (2010).
155
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The UDTA also provides a safe harbor for a directed trustee that is
uncertain how the willful misconduct standard applies in a particular
situation. In accordance with traditional trust law,158 § 9(d) provides
that “[a] directed trustee that has reasonable doubt about its duty under
this section may petition the [court] for instructions.”159 The availability
of such relief is limited by the requirement that the trustee’s doubt
about its duty must be “reasonable”—a trustee cannot petition when its
duty is obvious—but the express recognition of a safe harbor for a
proper petition for instructions should provide comfort to directed trustees. In providing this safe harbor, the UDTA again innovates on existing
state statutes. Delaware, for example, makes no express provision for
the right to petition,160 leaving the matter to background law.
3. Potential for Adaptation
The UDTA’s fiduciary standard for a directed trustee could be
modified in the same way as its standard for a trust director.161 Although the UDTA adopts a willful misconduct standard, the architecture of the UDTA can be adapted to some other standard of duty,
including no duty. Thus, South Dakota, New Hampshire, Nevada or another state that desires no duty for a directed trustee could adapt the
UDTA by passing the act as it now stands, with the one alteration of
eliminating the willful misconduct standard and replacing it with language that waives a directed trustee’s liability entirely.162
4. Reasonable Action
Although the willful misconduct standard is perhaps the most salient of the UDTA provisions governing the fiduciary duty of a directed
trustee, § 9 also contains other important provisions. Section 9(a) provides that subject to the prohibition on willful misconduct in subsection
(b), “a directed trustee shall take reasonable action to comply with a
trust director’s exercise or nonexercise of a power of direction or further
power under Section 6(b)(1) and the trustee is not liable for the action.”163 In other words, unless complying with a direction would cause
158 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (“A trustee or beneficiary may apply to an appropriate court for instructions regarding the administration or distribution of the trust if there is reasonable doubt about the powers or
duties of the trusteeship or about the proper interpretation of the trust provisions.”).
159 UDTA § 9(d).
160 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313.
161 See infra Part II.A.5.
162 To clarify, the willful misconduct standard would need to be changed to no duty
in both UDTA § 9 and § 10. We discuss § 10 infra Part II.C.
163 UDTA § 9(a).
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a trustee to engage in willful misconduct, the trustee has an affirmative
duty to comply.
This duty to comply depends on context and requires compliance
with the terms of the trust. A power of direction under which a trust
director may give a trustee an express direction will require the trustee
to comply by following the direction. A power that requires a trustee to
obtain permission from a trust director before acting imposes a duty on
the trustee to obtain the required permission. A power that allows a
director to amend the trust imposes on the trustee a duty to take reasonable action to facilitate the amendment and then comply with its terms.
A trustee’s duty to comply is also limited by the scope of the trust
director’s power of direction. A directed trustee does not have to comply with a direction that is outside of the director’s power of direction.
Indeed, under § 9(a), the trustee has a duty not to comply, since doing
so would breach the trustee’s duty to act in accordance with the terms of
the trust.164 For example, a trustee should not follow a direction to make
a distribution given by a trust director with a power only over investment. Likewise, an attempt by a director to exercise a power of direction in a form contrary to that required by the terms of the trust, such as
an oral direction if the terms of the trust require a writing, is not within
the trust director’s power and does not require compliance by a trustee.
In addition to imposing a duty to comply with a trust director’s
valid exercise or nonexercise of the director’s powers, UDTA § 9(a)
provides a standard for assessing a trustee’s compliance. A trustee must
“take reasonable action” to comply.165 If a trust director with a power to
direct investments directs the trustee to purchase a particular security,
for example, the trustee must take care to ensure that he or she
purchases the security within a reasonable time and at reasonable cost
and must refrain from self-dealing and conflicts of interest in doing so.
The duty to take reasonable action thus preserves the conventional
duties of trusteeship regarding the execution of a trust director’s orders.
The duty to take reasonable action does not, however, impose a duty to
ensure that the substance of a direction is reasonable. To the contrary,
subject to the willful misconduct rule of UDTA § 9(b), a trustee that
takes reasonable action to comply with a power of direction is not liable
for so acting even if the substance of the direction is unreasonable. In
other words, subject to the willful misconduct rule, a trustee is liable
only for its own breach of trust in the ministerial execution of a direc164 See, e.g., UTC § 105(b)(2) (amended 2005) (making mandatory “the duty of a
trustee to act . . . in accordance with the terms . . . of the trust”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 76 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (“The trustee has a duty to administer the trust . . .
in accordance with the terms of the trust.”).
165 UDTA § 9(a) (emphasis added).
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tion, and not for the director’s breach of trust in giving the direction.
Returning to the example of a direction to purchase a security, the trustee is not required to assess whether the purchase of the security would
be prudent in relation to the trust’s investment portfolio. The trustee is
only required (i) to exercise reasonable care in discerning whether the
direction to purchase the security was within the director’s power, and
(ii) to employ reasonable care in executing the purchase at a reasonable
price, time, and manner, unless by doing so the trustee would engage in
willful misconduct.
The affirmative duty to comply and the reasonability standard for
execution in compliance both count as major practical innovations in the
UDTA that improve substantially on existing statutes. The Delaware
statute, for example, neglects to impose an affirmative duty of compliance, leaving some doubt about whether a trustee even has a duty to
comply with a director’s direction.166 More worrisome, a literal reading
of the Delaware statute would suggest that a directed trustee does not
have to act reasonably even when it chooses to comply. Under the Delaware statute, a trustee might not face any liability for its own negligence
in executing a direction, so long as the negligence does not rise to willful
misconduct. A trustee who unreasonably delays in executing a trust director’s order to sell property, for example, would arguably not be liable
so long as the delay was merely negligent or imprudent, rather than willful.167 The UDTA’s solution of requiring a trustee to take reasonable
action is thus intent-implementing. Manifestly, a settlor would not want
an appropriately exercised power of direction to be undermined by a
trustee’s sloppy execution.
5. Limits on a Power to Release a Trustee From Liability
The UDTA offers yet another practical innovation in the form of
the limits it imposes on a trust director’s power to release a trustee from
liability. Because a power of direction can include any “power over a
166 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313 (2018). The duty to comply would have to be
found in the background rule of trust law that a trustee must administer the trust in
accordance with its terms. See supra note 164 and text accompanying.
167 Delaware provides that “If a governing instrument provides that a fiduciary is to
follow the direction of an adviser or is not to take specified actions except at the direction
of an adviser, and the fiduciary acts in accordance with such a direction, then except in
cases of wilful misconduct on the part of the fiduciary so directed, the fiduciary shall not
be liable for any loss resulting directly or indirectly from any such act.” DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12, § 3313(b). One could arguably read a duty of reasonable action into the phrase “in
accordance with such a direction,” by saying that a trustee who executes a direction negligently is not acting “in accordance” with the direction. But this puts considerable pressure on vague statutory language that was probably not designed to bear it.
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trust,”168 one possible form of a power of direction is to empower a
director to release a trustee or another director from liability for acts
done in the past or the future. Such a power, although apt in some circumstances, is nevertheless vulnerable to manipulation and abuse. Suppose, for example, a trustee lies to a trust director to induce the director
to release the trustee from liability. Should such a release be effective?
To address these problems, UDTA § 9(c) provides that a power to
release a trustee or another trust director from liability for breach of
trust is not effective under three circumstances: “(1) the breach involved
the trustee’s or other director’s willful misconduct; (2) the release was
induced by improper conduct of the trustee or other director in procuring the release; or (3) at the time of the release, the director did not
know the material facts relating to the breach.” The drafting committee
based the second and third of these safeguards on Uniform Trust Code
§ 1009.169 These two provisions thus apply to a release given by a trust
director the same safeguards applicable to a release given by a beneficiary. The first limit is an innovation of the UDTA. Consistent with the
mandatory minimum duty of a directed trustee under § 9(b) to avoid
willful misconduct, § 9(c)(1) prohibits release by a trust director of a
trustee or other director for willful misconduct.
C. Information Sharing Among Trustees and Trust Directors (UDTA
§ 10)
Another question in a directed trust is how much information a
trust director and a directed trustee must share with each other. If a
director has a power to invest trust assets and a trustee has a power to
distribute them, how much must the director and the trustee tell each
other about how they carry out their respective responsibilities? What if
a trust director has the power to amend the trust? Does the director
have a duty to inform the trustee of an amendment? The question of
what information a trustee and director must share is important, because the various fiduciaries in a directed trust often cannot sensibly
exercise their powers without information from the other fiduciaries. A
trustee tasked with tax filings and other administrative tasks cannot
function without a valuation of trust property invested by a trust director in nonmarket assets.
Most existing directed trust statutes ignore this problem, making it
a source of litigation.170 Although many states have provisions that gov168

UDTA § 2(5).
UTC § 1009 is consistent with prevailing common law and similar in substance to
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 97 (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
170 In Shelton v. Tamposi, 62 A.3d 741 (N.H. 2013), for example, a trustee with authority to make distributions sued to force directors with authority over investments to
169
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ern communications between a directed trustee and a beneficiary, few
states make any provision for communications between a trustee and a
trust director.171 Delaware and South Dakota, for example, are silent on
the issue, leaving courts and parties to guess at what a director’s and a
trustee’s duties to share information might be—or else to assume that a
director and a trustee have no duties to share information. Illinois provides that a director has a duty to communicate with a trustee, but not
that a trustee has a duty to communicate with a director.172
Silence on the issue of trustee-trust director communication is not a
workable solution, because background trust fiduciary law does not
solve the problem. The generic declaration in many statutes that a trust
director is a fiduciary is insufficient, because these statutes say nothing
about what exactly a trust director’s fiduciary duty entails. There is no
precedent that would read a duty to share information into the broad
declaration that a trust director is a “fiduciary.” Additionally, even if
these statutes imply something about the duty of a trust director, they
say nothing about the duty of a trustee. The law of trusts has not traditionally imposed a duty on a trustee to share information with a fiduciary other than a cotrustee, so in the absence of a statute, it is not
obvious whether a trustee even has such a duty. The UDTA’s strategy in
§ 8 of applying the duties of a similarly situated trustee to a trust director does not solve the problem either, because as just noted the duties of
a trustee did not historically include a duty to communicate with a fiduciary other than a cotrustee.
1. The UDTA Solution
The problem of trustee-trust director communication thus requires
a special rule. UDTA § 10(b) provides that a trust director “shall provide information to a trustee or another trust director to the extent the
information is reasonably related both to: (1) the powers or duties of the
director; and (2) the powers or duties of the trustee or other director.”173 Section 10(a) imposes a similar duty on a directed trustee to
share information with a trust director.
These mirror-image duties to share information mandate the sharing of just enough information, balancing each fiduciary’s need for inforliquidate investments to raise cash for distribution. The dispute involved, among other
things, questions over how much information the investment directors had to share with
the trustee.
171 The Colorado statute is an exception. It requires a trustee and trust director to
share information with each other under certain circumstances. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 15-16-806(1)-(2) (2014).
172 See 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.3(h) (2015).
173 UDTA § 10(b).
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mation with the settlor’s intent to divide responsibility for administering
the trust. Sections 10(a) and 10(b) require a trustee or director to share
information only if the information is reasonably related to the powers
or duties of both the person communicating the information and the
person receiving it. The information must be related to the powers or
duties of the person communicating the information, because otherwise
that person could not be expected to possess or understand the information. The information must also be related to the powers or duties of the
person receiving the information, because otherwise the person would
not need the information. For both the person communicating the information and the person receiving it, the relationship of the information
to powers and duties must be “reasonable.” A director cannot compel
disclosure of information that is only tangentially related to the director’s powers or duties or that the director desires to know merely for the
sake of curiosity.
2. Affirmative and Responsive Duties to Inform
The duties of a trustee and trust director to share information include both an affirmative duty to provide information (even in the absence of a request for that information) and a responsive duty to reply
to requests for information. For example, if a trust director exercises a
power to modify the terms of a trust, the director would have an affirmative duty to inform the trustee and other trust directors whose powers
or duties are reasonably related to the amendment whether or not the
trustee or other trust directors inquired about the amendment. Similarly, the director would have a responsive duty to provide information
about the amendment upon a request by a trustee or another trust director whose powers or duties were reasonably related to the amendment.
3. Safe Harbor for Reliance on Information
UDTA § 10 also provides safe harbors for trust directors and trustees who act in reliance on information provided to them by another
trust fiduciary under that section.174 The safe harbors only apply, however, if the trustee or trust director who relies on the information is not
engaged in willful misconduct. For example, § 10(c) protects a trustee if
the trustee acts in reliance on a trust director’s valuation of an asset,
unless by accepting the valuation the trustee would engage in willful
misconduct. As in § 9, the rationale for the safe harbor and willful misconduct limit is to implement a settlor’s division of labor between a trustee and director, subject to a mandatory fiduciary minimum.
174

Id. § 10(c)–(d).
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4. Duty to Inform Beneficiaries
The duty in UDTA § 10 governs disclosure of information among
trustees and trust directors. It does not govern disclosure to a beneficiary by a trustee or a trust director. The duty of a directed trustee to
inform a beneficiary is governed principally by the background trust fiduciary law of an enacting state.175 The duty of a trust director to inform
a beneficiary is governed principally by UDTA § 8, which as we have
seen prescribes the fiduciary duties of a trust director. However, the duties of both a trustee and a trust director to inform a beneficiary are
limited by UDTA § 11, to which we turn next.
D. Cross-Monitoring (UDTA § 11)
The requirement under UDTA § 10 of information sharing among
trustees and trust directors raises further questions. What if a trustee
learns that a trust director is acting in breach of the director’s duties? Or
what if a trust director learns that a trustee is acting in breach of its
duties? The UDTA’s allocation of fiduciary responsibility in §§ 8 and 9
limit a trustee’s and trust director’s duty to prevent each other’s misconduct. But what about a trustee’s or trust director’s duty to notify beneficiaries about each other’s misconduct?
1. No Duties to Monitor, Inform, or Advise
As discussed above, in Rollins v. Branch Banking & Trust Company of Virginia,176 the court considered the fiduciary liability of a trustee who was subject to direction in investment. The court declined to
hold the trustee liable for the investment director’s failure to direct diversification of the trust’s investments. But the court nevertheless held
the trustee liable for failing to advise the beneficiaries about the risks of
the investment director’s failure. As Rollins illustrates, a directed trustee
might discover a director’s misconduct before a beneficiary does. If a
trustee has a duty to share this information with the beneficiary—to inform a beneficiary that the trustee disagrees with a director’s choices—
that duty could become a backdoor for undoing the limitation on a directed trustee’s fiduciary responsibility under UDTA § 9.
After Rollins, many states enacted fixes to their directed trust statutes to relieve a directed trustee from liability for a Rollins-like failure
to warn a beneficiary. Following these statutes, the UDTA offers its own
form of relief. UDTA § 11(a) provides that “a trustee does not have a
duty to . . . monitor a trust director . . . or . . . inform or give advice to a
175 See, e.g., UTC § 813(a) (amended 2004); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82
(AM. LAW INST. 2007). Such law is expressly preserved by UDTA § 4.
176 56 Va. Cir. 147 (2002); see supra note 153 and text accompanying.
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settlor, beneficiary, trustee, or trust director concerning an instance in
which the trustee might have acted differently than the director.”177 Section 11(b) provides a mirror-image rule for a trust director, relieving a
director of a duty to monitor, inform, or give advice to others about the
conduct of a trustee or other trust director.
This provision offers significant practical improvements on similar
provisions in the existing directed statutes. Unlike many existing statutes, UDTA § 11 covers both trustees and trust directors. Many statutes
relieve a trustee of a duty to monitor a trust director, but say nothing
about whether a director has a duty to monitor a trustee. Additionally,
the language in UDTA § 11 is clearer and more concise than many state
statutes, cutting through unnecessary and imprecise verbiage to state the
point directly.178
2. Survival of General Duty of Disclosure
Although UDTA § 11 confirms that a directed trustee has no duty
to monitor a trust director or inform or give advice to others concerning
instances in which the trustee might have acted differently than the director, § 11 does not relieve a trustee of its ordinary duties to disclose,
report, or account under otherwise applicable law.179 The same is true
for a trust director, on whom UDTA § 8(a) imposes the fiduciary duties
of a similarly situated trustee.
177

UDTA § 11(a).
The Alaska statute, for example, provides that “the trustee does not have an obligation to review, inquire, investigate, or make recommendations or evaluations with respect to the exercise of a power of the trustee if the exercise of the power complies with
the directions given to the trustee.” ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.375 (2017). Taken literally,
this language fails to relieve a trustee from liability for actions of a trust director that do
not require action by a trustee. If, for example, a trust director exercises a power to
amend a trust, the statute would not relieve the trustee for failing to advise the beneficiaries about the amendment, because by its terms the statute only covers “the exercise of
a power of the trustee” and not the exercise of an independent power of the director that
requires no action by the trustee. The Alaska statute also fails to cover nonexercises (as
distinct from exercises) of the powers of a director or trustee, with the result that it would
not have covered even the Rollins case.
Similarly, the Nevada statute provides,
A directed fiduciary is not liable for any obligation to perform an investment or
suitability review, inquiry or investigation or to make any recommendation or
evaluation with respect to any investment, to the extent that the investment is
made by a directing trust adviser.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.5549(2) (2015). This language covers only investments, with the
result that it does not relieve a trustee from liability for failing to inform beneficiaries
about the myriad other powers a director might hold, such as the power to direct distributions or to value trust property.
179 See, e.g., UTC § 813 (amended 2004); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82
(AM. LAW INST. 2007).
178
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For example, if a trust director has a power to direct investments
and the director uses that power to concentrate the trust portfolio,
UDTA § 11 would relieve a directed trustee of any duty to warn a beneficiary about the risks of such a concentration. The trustee would remain
under any otherwise applicable duty, however, to keep records and to
make periodic reports or accountings to the beneficiary and to answer
reasonable inquiries by the beneficiary about the administration of the
trust.
3. No Assumption of Duty
In addition to waiving a directed trustee’s duty to monitor, inform,
or give advice as under UDTA § 11, many state directed trust statutes
go further and also provide that if a trustee for some reason chooses to
monitor, inform, or give advice, these activities will be deemed to be
“administrative actions.”180 The purpose of these provisions is to ensure
that if a directed trustee chooses to monitor, inform, or give advice, the
trustee does not take on a continuing obligation to do so or concede a
prior duty to have done so. UDTA § 11(a)(2) improves on these provisions by eschewing the opacity of the term “administrative actions” in
favor of an express provision that if a trustee monitors, informs, or gives
advice about the actions of a trust director, the trustee does not thereby
assume a duty to do so. Section 11(b)(2) applies the same rule to a trust
director.
III. ADAPTING

THE

SUBSIDIARY RULES

OF

TRUSTEESHIP

In addition to addressing fiduciary duty, the UDTA also addresses
a variety of subsidiary, non-fiduciary matters. In so doing, the UDTA
sigificantly improves on existing statutes. Although almost all existing
directed trusts pay some attention to fiduciary duties, none provides a
comprehensive treatment of the many subsidiary matters that can arise
in a directed trusteeship. The appointment, succession, and vacancy of a
trust director, as well as the defenses available to the director and applicable limitations period for litigation against the director, are generally
not addressed. Other important matters such as compensation of the
director likewise receive no mention.
The UDTA, by contrast, foresees these problems and addresses
them. It provides a comprehensive system of rules to address for a trust
director all of the same matters that the subsidiary rules of trusteeship
address for a trustee. The UDTA achieves this comprehensive treatment
by employing the same concept it employs in providing fiduciary duties:
it adopts the law of trusteeship. In a wide variety of subsidiary areas,
180

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(e) (2018).
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like acceptance, compensation, succession and defenses, the UDTA applies to a trust director the same rules that would apply to a trustee in a
like position and similar circumstances. At the same time, the UDTA
takes care to adopt the law of trusteeship in a manner sensitive to the
distinctive needs of trust directors.
A. Rule of Decision for Jointly Held Powers of Direction
The first important subsidiary matter involves a rule of decision
when a trust director holds its powers jointly with another trust director.
Following the prevailing rule of majority action for cotrustees,181 UDTA
§ 6(b)(2) provides a default rule of majority action for “trust directors
with joint powers.”182 Thus, for example, a three-person committee with
a power of direction over investment or distribution would act by majority decision unless the terms of the trust provided otherwise.183
B. Office of Trust Director
UDTA § 16 applies to the office of trust director, as it were, a wide
variety of rules that apply to the office of trustee. The UDTA, in other
words, systematically adopts for a trust director the many mechanical
rules for a trustee that appear in Article VII of the Uniform Trust Code,
including acceptance,184 bond,185 reasonable compensation,186 resignation,187 removal,188 and vacancy.189 Section 16 provides that regarding
each of these matters, “[u]nless the terms of a trust provide otherwise,
the rules applicable to a trustee apply to a trust director.”190
181 See UTC § 703(a) (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 39. The comment
to UDTA § 6(b)(2) clarifies that the drafting committee assumed that in the event of a
deadlock among trust directors with joint powers, by analogy to a deadlock among cotrustees, a court could “direct exercise of the [joint] power or take other action to break
the deadlock.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 39 cmt. e.
182 UDTA § 6(b)(2).
183 The duty and liability of a trust director is governed by UDTA § 8, which applies
the fiduciary duty of trusteeship to a trust director. Under UDTA § 8(a)(1)(B), a trust
director that holds a power of direction jointly with a trustee or another trust director
would be subject to the fiduciary duty of a cotrustee.
184 See, e.g., UTC § 701(a)–(b); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 35.
185 See, e.g., UTC § 702(a)–(b); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 34(3) (AM.
LAW INST. 2003).
186 See, e.g., UTC § 708; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 38 cmt. i.
187 See, e.g., UTC § 705 (amended 2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 36.
188 See, e.g., UTC § 706; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. e.
189 See, e.g., UTC § 704 (amended 2004); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 31
cmt. a.
190 UDTA § 16. The drafting committee intended that these rules would be “default
or mandatory as applied to a trust director depend[ing] on whether [the rule] is default or
mandatory as applied to a trustee.” Id. cmt.
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The UDTA drafting committee, however, took note that a trust director and a trustee can sometimes differ in important ways. As a practical matter, therefore, a court will have to be thoughtful about extending
the rules of trusteeship to a trust director, because the circumstances of
a trust director are often (though not always) different from the circumstances of a trustee.
For example, UDTA § 16(1) adopts for a trust director the same
law that applies to a trustee regarding acceptance of appointment.
Whether a trust director has accepted an appointment is thus determined by the same principles that determine whether a trustee has accepted appointment. A trustee, however, is expected to participate
actively in the administration of the trust. At a minimum, a trustee must
hold title to trust assets, which often forces the trustee to take some sort
of action almost immediately. A trustee is therefore usually capable of
signaling acceptance by conduct.191 Even if the trustee has not expressly
accepted appointment, the trustee may signal acceptance by actions
alone.
The challenge in applying UDTA § 16(1), therefore, is that not
every trust director may take action quickly like a trustee. Some trust
directors may not take any action for long stretches of time, if ever. A
director with a power to determine a settlor’s competence may not act
for years or even decades. When a trust director delays acting in this
way, perceiving acceptance by conduct may become difficult.192 A court
must therefore apply the law of trustee acceptance sensitively, discerning what would be appropriate given the circumstances. Another example of the divide between a trustee and a trust director is a bond to
secure performance under § 16(2). In the usual case, a trust director
would not have custody of the trust property, making a bond typically
inappropriate for a trust director.
Vacancy presents a similar question of adaptation in light of context. Under Uniform Trust Code § 704, “a vacancy in a trusteeship need
not be filled” if “one or more cotrustees remain in office.” Under
UDTA § 16(6), the same rule applies to trust directors. If three of five
trust directors with a joint power to determine the settlor’s capacity remain in office, the court “need not” fill the vacancies, though the vacancies should be filled if doing so would be more consistent with the
settlor’s plan. Likewise, if the sole trust director with power over investment of the trust property ceases to serve, in most circumstances the
vacancy should be filled, and this is true even if other directors with
unrelated powers remain in office. An apt analogy is to a trust with sev191 See, e.g., UTC § 701(a)(2); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
INST. 2003).
192 UDTA § 16(1) cmt.

OF

TRUSTS § 35(1) (AM. LAW
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eral cotrustees, each of whom has controlling authority over different
aspects of the trust’s administration. If any of those trustees ceases to
serve, in many circumstances a court should appoint a successor even
though other cotrustees remain in office.
The provision in UDTA § 16(3) for “reasonable compensation” for
a trust director also merits some discussion. Reasonable compensation
for a trust director will vary based on the nature of the director’s powers, and in some circumstances may well be zero. Thus, in the comments
and in the legislative note accompanying § 16(3), the drafting committee
strongly urged that a state that provides statutory commissions for a
trustee should refrain from using the same commission formula for a
trust director and should instead use a rule of reasonable compensation.
Statutory commissions will often overcompensate a trust director, especially a director that does not participate actively and continuously in
the administration of the trust. At the same time, the state might take
the occasion of enacting the UDTA to abandon statutory commissions
for trustees too, as the reasonable compensation of a directed trustee is
likely to be less than that for a trustee that is not directed.193
C. Litigation Issues
As we have seen, the UDTA imposes on a trust director the fiduciary duties of a trustee “in a like position and under similar circumstances.”194 The drafting committee thus contemplated that a breach of
those duties by a trust director would be a breach of trust,195 and that
existing law governing standing to enforce a trust would resolve the
193 An apt analogy is to a trustee that hires others to “render services expected or
normally to be performed by the trustee.” The compensation of such a trustee ordinarily
declines in proportion to the trustee’s diminished responsibilities. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 38 cmt. c(1); see also UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT § 9 cmt. (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 1994) (“If, for example, the trustee’s regular compensation schedule presupposes that the trustee will conduct the investment management function, it should
ordinarily follow that the trustee will lower its fee when delegating the investment function to an outside manager.”).
194 UDTA § 8, discussed supra Part II.A.
195 UDTA § 2(1) confirms expressly in blackletter that the term “‘breach of trust’
includes a violation by a trust director or trustee of a duty imposed on that director or
trustee by the terms of the trust, this [act], or law of this state other than this [act] pertaining to trusts.” Furthermore, UDTA § 15 confirms that “by accepting appointment as
a trust director of a trust subject to this [act], the director submits to personal jurisdiction
of the courts of this state regarding any matter related to a power or duty of the director.” Several existing state directed trust statutes contain a similar provision, see, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-1-1105; GA. CODE. ANN. § 53-12-345 (2010); IDAHO CODE § 15-7501(1) (2007); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.3(g) (2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7809
(2010); MINN. STAT. § 501C.0808 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 456.8-808(11) (2018); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 163.5555 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:12-1203 (2017); WIS. STAT.
§ 701.0202 (2014), which is familiar from law of trusteeship, see, e.g., UTC § 202(a).
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question of who could bring an action for redress against the director.196
But what of limitation periods and defenses? The UDTA’s answers to
these questions counts as another practical improvement on most existing directed trust statutes.
With respect to limitation periods, UDTA § 13 absorbs the rules
that would apply to a trustee in a like position and under similar circumstances. Thus, subsection (a) applies to a trust director any statutory limitation rule enjoyed by a trustee, and subsection (b) applies to a trust
director any rule of repose or limitation arising from a report or accounting to the beneficiaries.197 However, subsection (b) is phrased so
that it applies regardless of whether the report or accounting was made
by the trust director. A trust director may therefore be protected by a
report or accounting made by a trustee or another trust director even
though the director did not make the report or accounting, so long as
the report or accounting fairly discloses the relevant facts of the director’s conduct.
With respect to defenses in an action for breach of trust, UDTA
§ 14 makes available to a trust director the same defenses that would be
available to a trustee in a like position and under similar circumstances.
The comment to § 14 confirms that such defenses could include laches
or estoppel;198 consent, release, or ratification by a beneficiary;199 reasonable reliance on the terms of a trust;200 and reasonable care in ascertaining the happening of an event affecting administration or
distribution.201
Another question likely to arise in litigation involving a trust director is the ability of the director to seek indemnification for attorney’s
fees. The drafting committee contemplated that, in the event that the
terms of a trust are silent on this question, it would be governed by
UDTA § 6(b)(1). As we have seen, § 6(b)(1) establishes a default rule
that allows a trust director to exercise “any further power appropriate to
196

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94 (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
The comment to UDTA § 13 confirms that “[l]aches, which strictly speaking is an
equitable defense rather than a limitations period, would apply to an action against a
trust director under Section 14.”
198 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 98 (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
199 See, e.g., UTC § 1009 (amended 2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 97(b)–(c).
200 See, e.g., UTC § 1006; UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT § 1(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1994).
201 See, e.g., UTC § 1007; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76 cmt. f. As observed above, see supra note 125 and text accompanying, the UDTA also separately absorbs the law governing a trustee’s exoneration and exculpation. Section 8(a) provides
that “the terms of the trust may vary the director’s duty or liability to the same extent the
terms of the trust could vary the duty or liability of a trustee in a like position and under
similar circumstances.” UDTA § 8(a).
197
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the exercise or nonexercise of a power of direction granted to the director.”202 By default, therefore, a trust director would have a power to
incur and be indemnified for attorney’s fees and other expenses “appropriate” to the exercise of the director’s expressly granted powers. Such a
direction would normally be appropriate if a trustee in a like position
and under similar circumstances would be entitled to indemnification of
costs and expenses.
IV. RECONCILING COTRUSTEESHIP
The final stop on our tour through the UDTA is the reconciliation
in § 12 of the law of cotrusteeship with the broad settlor autonomy recognized by the UDTA for a directed trust.
A. Traditional Law
The traditional understanding of cotrusteeship is that it is a safeguard imposed by the settlor. The beneficiaries are protected against
trustee misconduct by the presence of multiple trustees. As one Scots
judge put the point in 1897,
It is, of course, disagreeable to take a cotrustee by the throat,
but if a man undertakes to act as trustee he must face the necessity of doing disagreeable things when they become necessary in order to keep the estate intact. A trustee is not entitled
to purchase a quiet life at the expense of the estate, or to act as
good-natured men sometimes do in their own affairs, in letting
things slide and losing money rather than create ill feeling.203
A complex web of default and mandatory rules, much of which persists in today’s law, reflects this understanding of cotrusteeship as a beneficiary safeguard. On the powers side, under traditional law the default
rule was that cotrustees were required to act unanimously.204 Under
modern law, the default rule is that multiple trustees may act by majority, unless there are only two, in which case they may act unanimously.205 Under both rules of construction, a single trustee does not
have the power alone to transfer or otherwise deal with the trust
property.206
202

UDTA § 6(c)(1), discussed supra Part I.C.
SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 76, 611 n.37 (quoting Miller’s Trustees v.
Polson, (1897) SC 1038, 1043 (Scot.)).
204 See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 76, at 610–11.
205 See, e.g., UTC § 703(a) (amended 2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 39
(AM. LAW INST. 2012).
206 See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 76, at 610–11.
203
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On the duties side, the default rule is that each cotrustee is under a
duty to participate actively in the administration of the trust.207 Each
cotrustee has the right to receive information about the administration
of the trust.208 And the modern authorities are uniform in recognizing a
duty in each cotrustee “to use reasonable care to prevent a cotrustee
from committing a breach of trust and, if a breach of trust occurs, to
obtain redress.”209 This duty to prevent or seek redress for a cotrustee’s
breach of trust applies even if the settlor limits the role or function of
one of the cotrustees. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains:
“Even in matters for which a trustee is relieved of responsibility, . . . if
the trustee knows that a co-trustee is committing or attempting to commit a breach of trust, the trustee has a duty to take reasonable steps to
prevent the fiduciary misconduct.”210 Moreover, “even in the absence of
any duty to intervene or grounds for suspicion, a trustee is entitled to
request and receive reasonable information regarding an aspect of trust
administration in which the trustee is not required to participate.”211
B. Cotrusteeship Under the UDTA
The foregoing rules for a cotrustee stand in stark contrast with the
less demanding fiduciary standards for a directed trustee under UDTA
§§ 9, 10, and 11. The drafting committee therefore gave considerable
attention to reconciling the law of cotrusteeship with the new law of
directed trusts. The committee’s aim was to avoid disrupting existing
trust practice while bringing to cotrusteeship the broad settlor autonomy
recognized by the UDTA for a directed trust.
1. Law of Cotrusteeship by Default
The UDTA preserves the distinction between a directed trust and a
cotrusteeship. Under the UDTA, a “power of direction” cannot be held
by a person while the person is serving as a trustee, nor can a person be
207

See, e.g., UTC § 703(c); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81(1) cmt. c.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81 cmt. b.
209 Id. § 81(2); see also UTC § 703(g).
210 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81 cmt. b. The duty to take reasonable steps
to prevent or redress a breach of trust by a cotrustee in UTC § 703(g) is not expressly
made mandatory by UTC § 105(b). However, § 105(b) does make mandatory a cotrustee’s duty “to act in good faith.” And in most cases, good faith would require a cotrustee to take reasonable steps to prevent or redress another cotrustee’s breach of trust
even if the terms of the trust limit the cotrusee’s sphere of responsibility. This construction of §§ 105 and 703 is supported by the framing of UDTA § 12 as enabling a weakening of a cotrustee’s cross-monitoring duty, and by the subsequent 2018 amendment to
§ 703(g) to make it “[s]ubject to” UDTA § 12. UTC § 703(g) (amended 2018).
211 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2007).
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a “trust director” while the person is serving as a trustee.212 In consequence, a cotrustee with a power to direct another cotrustee is not a
trust director, and the other cotrustee is not a directed trustee. Instead,
relations between multiple trustees remain subject by default to the law
of cotrusteeship.
2. Authorizing Opt Out from Traditional Cotrusteeship Law
Under the UDTA, however, a settlor may opt out of the default law
of cotrusteeship, and instead subject cotrustees to the more permissive
fiduciary rules of a directed trusteeship as prescribed by §§ 9, 10, and 11.
The drafting committee reasoned that, because a “settlor could choose
the more permissive rules of a directed trusteeship by labeling one of
the cotrustees as a trust director and another as a directed trustee,”
there was little reason not to allow the settlor to apply “the fiduciary
rules of [a directed trust] to a cotrusteeship.”213 To this end, UDTA § 12
provides,
The terms of a trust may relieve a cotrustee from duty and
liability with respect to another cotrustee’s exercise or nonexercise of a power of the other cotrustee to the same extent that
in a directed trust a directed trustee is relieved from duty and
liability with respect to a trust director’s power of direction
under Sections 9 through 11.214
Under the UDTA, therefore, if the terms of the trust so provide, a
cotrustee may have only the duty required by the reasonable action and
willful misconduct standards specified in § 9 with respect to another cotrustee’s exercise or nonexercise of a power of that other cotrustee.
Likewise, the terms of a trust can displace the duty under traditional law
to take reasonable action to prevent a breach of trust by a cotrustee and
the rule giving every trustee access to information regarding all aspects
of the administration of the trust, replacing those rules with the less de212

UDTA § 2(5), (9).
Id. cmt. The drafting committee also took note of similar provisions in Alaska,
Florida, and North Carolina. ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.072(c) (2013); FLA. STAT.
§ 736.0703(9) (2014); N.C. GEN STAT. § 36C-7-703(g1) (2005). After Section 12 was in
draft form, Delaware and New Hampshire adopted similar provisions. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12, § 3313A (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:7-711(c) (2017).
214 UDTA § 12. The legislative note gives instructions for revising UTC § 703 to conform with this provision, and the Uniform Law Commission has since revised UTC § 703
to make it subject to the UDTA. See supra note 210. The comment to UDTA § 12 also
explains that it applies only “to a cotrustee that takes direction,” akin to a directed trustee, and not the duties of a cotrustee that gives direction, akin to a trust director, because
under UDTA § 8 the duties of a trust director are those of a similarly situated trustee.
213
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manding rules for a directed trustee under § 10 for information sharing
and § 11 for cross-monitoring.
3. A Question of Construction
Whether the traditional law of cotrusteeship or the more permissive
rules of a directed trust apply to a particular cotrusteeship is a question
of construction.215 The default rule is that the traditional law of cotrusteeship applies. But if the terms of the trust manifest a contrary intent,
under § 12 the reduced fiduciary duties of a directed trusteeship will
apply instead.
For example, a familiar drafting strategy is to name cotrustees but
also to provide that in the event of disagreement about a particular matter the decision of a specified trustee controls and the other cotrustee
has no liability in that event. Another familiar drafting strategy is to give
one cotrustee power over investment of certain trust property. For example, a family cotrustee might have controlling power over decisions
pertaining to a family business held in the trust. It is common in this
kind of trust to relieve the cotrustee who does not direct investments
from liability for matters under the control of the other cotrustee.
Under traditional law, in spite of such a provision, the cotrustee
who does not exercise a controlling power would remain under a duty to
take reasonable steps to prevent a breach by the controlling cotrustee.
Under the UDTA, by contrast, the noncontrolling cotrustee would be
liable only for its own willful misconduct, and would not be otherwise
responsible for the actions of the controlling cotrustee.216 In other
words, the controlling cotrustee would be treated like a trust director,
and the noncontrolling cotrustee would be treated like a directed
trustee.
4. Title Holding and Third Party Rights
The change in the law of cotrusteeship effected by the UDTA pertains only to fiduciary governance within the trust. The UDTA “does
not alter the rules that affect the rights of third parties who contract with
or otherwise interact with a cotrustee.”217 The official comment elaborates thus:
215 Nothing in UDTA § 12 requires an express reference to that provision to invoke
the rule prescribed by it. UDTA § 12 cmt.
216 Recall, however, that under UDTA § 3(a) the act applies to a trust created before
the effective date of the act, but only as to a decision or action occurring on or after that
date.
217 UDTA § 12 cmt.
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The principal difference between cotrusteeship and directed
trusteeship is that in a cotrusteeship every cotrustee has title to
the trust property, whereas in a directed trusteeship, title to
trust property belongs only to the trustee, and not to the trust
director. The placement of title can have important consequences for dealings with third parties and for tax, property,
and other bodies of law outside of trust law. This section does
not change the rights of third parties who deal with a cotrustee
in the cotrustee’s capacity as such.218
Instead, the UDTA changes only “the degree to which the terms of a
trust may reduce a cotrustee’s duty and liability.”219
CONCLUSION
The UDTA addresses the key difficulties in a directed trust more
comprehensively, more effectively, and more simply than existing directed trust statutes. The UDTA draws the scope of its application with
care and precision and offers sensitive and thorough rules to govern the
fiduciary duties of both a trust director and a directed trustee. The
UDTA offers the first comprehensive treatment of the many matters of
trust administration in a directed trust that go beyond fiduciary duties,
such as acceptance, compensation and defenses. And the UDTA provides a simple update to the traditional law of cotrusteeship by permitting a settlor to apply to cotrustees the same flexible scheme of fiduciary
duties that applies to a trust director and a directed trustee.
Although some state legislatures might disagree with some of the
policy choices in the UDTA—especially with regard to the fiduciary duties of a directed trustee and trust director—the UDTA is nevertheless
appropriate for enactment in every state. The UDTA offers many practical innovations that could benefit every state, and the small elements
of policy disagreement between the UDTA and enacting states can easily be addressed by appropriate modifications to the UDTA. Practitioners drafting trusts not governed by the UDTA might benefit from the
UDTA by consulting it as a source of model provisions and as a guide to
the key issues posed by a directed trust.
Many centuries of legal development have placed the trustee at the
center of a trust and its administration. Then came directed trusts. With
the promulgation of the UDTA, the law of trusts is catching up to the
rise of flexible, multi-party trust administration by trustees in concert
with trust directors.
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